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RECENT DECISIONS
SECURITIES REGULATION FEDERAL PROCEDURE A CORPORATION HAS
To ENJOIN THE USE OF PROXIES SOLICITED IN VIOLATION OF

STANDING

THE PROXY RULES; THE SOLICITATION OF AUTHORIZATIONS To INSPECT A
STOCKHOLDERS' LIST Is WITHIN THE SCOPE OF § 14(a) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT; AND AN INJUNCTION MAY ISSUE UNDER
21(e) To STAY

§

PROCEEDINGS IN A STATE COURT DESPITE THE FEDERAL ANTI-INJUNCTION

Richard Gittlin, a New York resident and a stockholder of Studebaker, a Michigan corporation, became involved in a dispute with the Studebaker management. Gittlin obtained from fellow stockholders the required
number of authorizations to enable him to inspect Studebaker's stockholders'
list for the ultimate purpose of soliciting proxies for a forthcoming annual
STATUTE. -

meeting. In obtaining these authorizations, Gittlin failed to comply with the
Proxy Rules enacted by the Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter
SEC or the Commission] pursuant to § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 19342 [hereinafter SEA or the Act]. Gittlin commenced proceedings in the
Supreme Court of New York to inspect the record of the corporation's shareholders. Studebaker brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York to enjoin the use of the authorizations in the
state court proceedings. The district court found that the Proxy Rules had
been violated and granted the injunction. On appeal, Gittlin contended that
Studebaker had no standing to enjoin a stockholder's violation of the Proxy
Rules. Even were this not so, Gittlin maintained that authorizations for the
purpose of exercising a right of inspection are outside the scope of the Proxy
Rules. He further contended that the district court's order enjoining the use
of the authorizations violated the Federal Anti-Injunction Statute.' In affirming the decision of the district court, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held: a corporation may obtain injunctive relief against
unlawful proxy solicitation by a shareholder where the struggle is simply for
corporate control and no transaction damaging to the corporation is proposed;
§ 14(a) of the SEA should be construed to encompass authorizations to inspect
stockholders' lists, where obtaining the authorizations is part of a continuous
plan intended to end in solicitation and to prepare the way for its success; a
1

2

N.Y. BUSINESS CORPORATION LAw § 1315 provides:
'(a) Any resident of this state who shall have been a shareholder of record, for at
least six months immediately preceding his demand, of a foreign corporation doing
business in this state, or any resident of this state holding, or thereunto authorized in
writing by the holders of, at least five percent of any class of the outstanding shares,
...
may require such foreign corporation to produce a record of its shareholders ...
and shall have the right to examine in person or by agent or attorney . .. the record
of shareholders or an exact copy thereof ....
As amended, 78 Stat. 569, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy
or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted
security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.

3 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
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federal district court may enjoin state court proceedings at the request of a
private party where the very act of prosecuting the state proceeding violates
§ 14(a) of the SEA, since such an injunction is expressly authorized by Act
of Congress in § 21 (e) of the SEA. Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692
(2d Cir. 1966).
Section 14(a) of the SEA makes it unlawful for a person to solicit, or
permit the use of his name to solicit, any proxy in respect to a registered security
without compliance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the SEC. The
main purpose of this section is to protect the "investing public against misleading statements made in the course of a struggle for corporate control." 4
The chief means employed by the SEC to protect the public and ensure compliance with its rules is the injunction." However, the injunctive remedy for
enforcing § 14(a) presents several problems. Questions have arisen as to
who is entitled to seek an injunction for a violation of the Proxy Rules enacted
pursuant to § 14(a) and also what constitutes a violation which should be
enjoined. In Studebaker, the Second Circuit was faced with the specific problems of whether or not a corporation can enjoin the use of proxies solicited in
violation of the Proxy Rules and whether the use of authorizations to inspect
a stockholders' list in a state court proceeding without compliance with the
Proxy Rules is an enjoinable violation of those rules.
Section 21 (e) of the SEA6 provides that the Commission, when it appears
that a person is violating or about to violate a provision of the Act or a rule
issued thereunder, may bring an action for an injunction in the proper court.
However, the section is silent as to the standing of anyone other than the
Commission to sue for injunctive relief. This silence, together with the fact
that other sections of the Act expressly provide for a private right of action in
various situations,' has created problems with respect to standing to sue. The
silence of § 21 (e) as to the rights of others, however, should not be taken as
conclusive proof that no private remedy was intended. Likewise, enforcement
of the section, and the rules thereunder, was not intended to be limited solely
4 SEC v. May, 229 F.2d 123, 124 (2d Cir. 1956).
5, 2 Loss, SECURITMS RLEGULATION 931 (2d ed. 1961).
6 48 Stat. 900 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964) reads:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about
to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the
provisions of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation thereunder, it may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district court of the United States... to enjoin
such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond.
7 48 Stat. 890 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e); 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b);
48 Stat. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1964). The first section provides that
any person who wilfully participates in a transaction in violation of the preceding subsections
shall be liable to any person who shall purchase or sell any security at a price affected by such
transaction. The injured party may sue in law or equity to recover damages sustained as a
result of any such transaction. Under the second section, suit may be brought by the issuer of
a registered security for profits garnered through the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by a beneficial owner of the security, director, or officer by reason of his
relationship to the issuer. The last section provides that a person who makes a false statement
with respect to any material fact in any document filed pursuant to the chapter shall be liable
to any person who, in reliance upon the statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a
price affected by such statement, unless the person sued acted in good faith. The injured party

may sue in law or equity in any court of competent jurisdiction.
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to action by the Commission. Section 10(b) of the SEA,' a provision very
similar in wording to § 14(a), makes it unlawful for a person to use, in connection with the purchase and sale of a security, any deceptive device in contravention of the rules prescribed by the SEC as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors. This section, then, does
not specifically make available a civil cause of action to a private individual.
Nevertheless, § 10(b) has been judicially recognized as creating such a civil
remedy in private parties.' It seems only logical that this same recognition
should be granted to § 14 (a).
Such an interpretation of § 14(a) accords with the tort doctrine of civil
liability for violation of a statute. It is a settled principle of tort law that a
person who is a member of a class of persons a statute was designed to protect
may sue for injuries resulting from violation of the statute.1 0 Applying this
rule to the proxy clause of the SEA would result in the creation of a private
right of action in investors for injuries resulting from a violation of the Proxy
Rules. The applicability of this statutory tort liability doctrine to violations of
other sections of the SEA has been accepted in the past." Hence, it would
seem applicable to violations of § 14(a), since the right to sue for breach of a
statutory duty is regarded as so fundamental that it should not be denied unless
the intent of Congress is manifest."
The argument of expressio unius est exclusio alterius has also been advanced
in opposition to the recognition of a private right of action. It is argued that,
since Congress expressly provided for a private right of action in certain sections of the SEA, it thereby intended no private right for violations of the other
sections. Thus, a private right exists only where expressly provided for. At least
one court has accepted this rather weak argument. 3 However, in light of the
tort doctrine discussed above and the broad purpose of the SEA to regulate
securities transactions in order to decrease fraud, the better view, adopted in
several cases, holds that express provision for a private right of action in certain
sections of the Act was not intended to exclude a private right of action in
other sections. 4 Such a private right serves as a powerful preventive against
48 Stat. 891 '(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
9 Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188
F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
10 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 286, comment e (1934); See generally PROSSER, TORTS §
35 (3d ed. 1964).
11 E.g., Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.) (separate opinion), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 737 '(1944) (dealing with § 6(b) of the SEA); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (dealing with § 10 of the SEA).
12 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
13 Downing v. Howard, 68 F. Supp. 6 (D. Del. 1946), aff'd, 162 F.2d 654 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 818 (1947).
14 E.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d
238, 245 (2d Cir.) '(separate opinion), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
8
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fraud. Whatever force the expressio unius argument might possess is further
weakened by § 28(a) of the Act, which declares that the rights and remedies
provided in the Act shall be "in addition to any and all other rights and remedies
that may exist at law or in equity ....""
It should also be recognized that the SEC cannot carefully scrutinize all
proxy statements submitted under rules enacted pursuant to § 14(a). Due to
exigencies of time, its review of these statements is quite limited. Thus, the
failure of the SEC to act upon an alleged violation of the Proxy Rules should
not be regarded as an obstacle to a private person's right to sue. Rather, private enforcement of § 14(a) and the rules enacted thereunder has come to
be regarded as a "necessary supplement to Commission action."'" For this
reason, and perhaps for one or more of the other reasons indicated above, it
has been held that private parties do have a right to bring suit for violation of

§ 14 (a)."
Granting an individual a right to sue, however, does not ipso facto grant
the stockholders of a corporation a right to bring a derivative action. In a
derivative suit, the corporation, and not the stockholder, is the actual party
plaintiff. When faced with the question of whether a stockholder was entitled
to bring a derivative action for a violation of § 14(a), the Second Circuit, in
Howard v. Furst," answered in the negative. In Howard, a stockholder, suing
corporate directors for waste, sought to enjoin the voting of proxies obtained
by a proxy statement allegedly false and misleading in violation of the rules
enacted under § 14(a). The suit was a derivative action for the benefit of the
corporation. Leaving open the question of what rights § 14(a) had created in
the individual stockholders, the court held that the statute could not be regarded as creating a substantive civil right in a corporation which was enforceable by a stockholder in a derivative action. They found:
...nothing in the language of Section 14(a) or in the legislative history
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to warrant an inference that it was
the intention of Congress to create any rights whatever in a corporation
whose stockholders may be solicited by proxy statements prepared in contravention of the statutory mandate.' 9
The statute authorized the Commission to formulate rules in the public interest
and for the protection of investors, not for the protection of corporations. The
Second Circuit also adopted the weak expressio unius argument, declaring that,
where Congress intended to create a right of action in the corporation, the
statute so states.20
The decision in Howard v. Furst was much criticized. 2 Professor Loss
15 48 Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964).
16 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
17 Id. at 430-31.
18 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957).
19 Id. at 793.
20 Ibid.
21 The Howard decision received critical comment in 45 CALIF. L. Rv. 186 (1957);
70 HARv. L. Rav. 1493 (1957). This criticism was noted by Judge Friendly in Studebaker.

360 F.2d 692, 695 (2d Cir. 1966).
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regarded the decision as "highly questionable."22 Thus, it came as no surprise
when the United States Supreme Court, a few years later in J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak,2 s overruled this denial of the right of a stockholder to bring a derivative
suit. In Borak, it was alleged that there had been a violation of § 14(a) with
reference to certain proxy solicitation materials sent out by the directors of
Case. As a result, a merger, which would not have been approved but for false
and misleading statements, was approved by a small margin. The consummation of this merger damaged the Case corporate stockholders. The petitioner
in Borak contended that, if there were a private right of action under § 14(a),
such a right would not extend to derivative suits. Respondent, in turn, argued
that his was not a derivative claim. The respondent's argument proved irrelevant since the Court held that a right of action existed as to both direct and
derivative causes. 24 Having accepted a private right of action under § 14(a),
the Supreme Court went on to say:
The injury which a stockholder suffers from corporate action pursuant
t-) a deceptive proxy solicitation ordinarily flows from the damage done
the corporation, rather than from the damage inflicted directly upon
the stockholder. The damage suffered results not from the deceit practiced
on him alone, but rather from the deceit practiced on the stockholders as
a group. To hold that derivative actions are not within the sweep of the
section would therefore be tantamount to a denial of private relief.2 5
This view further implemented the basic purpose of § 14(a) to prevent both
management and others from using deceptive proxy solicitations as a means of
obtaining authorizations to act from unwary stockholders.25
Once the right of a stockholder to bring an action on the corporation's
behalf has been recognized, the validity of Judge Friendly's conclusion that the
corporation should be able to bring an action on its own behalf is apparent.
Since the corporation is recognized as possessing a juridical personality, any
other view would be illogical. Well aware that a struggle for corporate control
may be preliminary to a transaction damaging to the corporation, the court
in Studebaker advisedly declined to follow Howard v. Furst even where no transaction damaging to the corporation was actually being proposed. Language in
Rosen v. Alleghany Corp.27 seems to recognize this right of a corporation to
sue for a violation of § 14(a). The right of one corporate party to a provisional merger agreement to sue for violations of § 14(a) in the solicitation of
proxies intended to be used for a meeting at which the other corporation's
stockholders were to vote on the merger further supports the corporate right
to sue.2 8
22

2 Loss, op. cit. sapra note 5, at 950.

23 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
24 Id. at 431.
25 Id. at 432.
26 Id. at 431.
27 133 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). While this case was concerned primarily with an
action by a stockholders' "protective committee" to compel the defendant corporation to mail
the committee's proxy material, the court indicated that the corporation's motion to enjoin the
use of the proxy material would be granted if plaintiff failed to amend said material. Id. at 869.
28 Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D.Ill. 1964). Cited in
Annot., 12 L. Ed. 2d 1235, 1244 (1965).
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Accepting a corporate right of action under § 14(a), the Studebaker court
faced a second argument'- respondent Gittlin's contention that § 14(a) of
the SEA did not include authorizations to inspect a stockholders' list. If this
were true, the rules of the SEC governing the solicitation of proxies would be
inapplicable, and no injunction would issue for their violation. This argument
was crucial to respondent's case, since Gittlin had failed to comply with the
SEC's rule that requires filing solicitation material with the Commission before
sending it to security holders. 2
Under the SEA, "proxy" and "solicitation" are terms with very broad
meanings. The former includes every proxy, consent, or authorization within
the meaning of -§ 14(a)," while "solicitation" encompasses "any request to
execute or not to execute, or to revoke, a proxy" as well as the furnishing of
a communication to security holders "under circumstances reasonably calculated
to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy."'" In light
of the expansive meanings given to these terms by the SEC, it is not surprising
to find that the application of § 14(a) will not be limited merely to express
requests for power to exercise another's vote in an election of directors - a
very narrow interpretation of a proxy solicitation.
The leading case on the scope of the Proxy Rules is SEC v. Okin.2 0k in
involved an action brought by the SEC to enjoin a violation of its regulations.
The defendant had mailed a letter to corporate shareholders asking them not
to sign any proxies for the company and to revoke any they might already
have signed. This letter, which was false and misleading, violated the Proxy
Rules. However, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of 'New York held that the letter was not a solicitation of proxies subject to
SEC regulation. Although the court in 0kin was dealing with § 12(e) of thePublic
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 "s rather than § 14(a) of the SEA, this
section is "substantially identical" to § 14(a). Faced with the question of
whether or not the power of the SEC should be limited to the regulation of a
proxy, consent, or authorization in the strict sense, the Second Circuit decided
against such a proposition. It stated that the power of the SEC "extends to
any other writings which are part of a continuous plan ending in solicitation
and which prepare the way for its success." 4 Such an interpretation coincides
with the broad definition of solicitation above and is in accord with what has
been regarded as the "significant" modern development of uniform rules governing pre-proxy statement solicitation. 5
29 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1964).
30 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-r(d) (1964).
31 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(f) (1) (1964).
32 132 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1943).
33 49 Stat. 824, 15 U.S.C. § 791(e) (1964) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or to permit the use of his or its
name to solicit, by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or otherwise, any proxy, power of attorney, consent, or authorization
regarding any security of a registered holding company or a subsidiary company
thereof in contravention of such rules and regulations or orders as the Commission
deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors
or consumers or to prevent the circumvention of the provisions of this chapter or
the rules, regulations, or orders thereunder.

34 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943).

35

3 OLECK, MODERN CORPOATION LAW

§ 1487, at 568 (1959).
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This liberal recognition of the SEC's power also aids in the fulfillment of
the purpose of § 14(a) to give the SEC a necessary measure of control over
the relationship between stockholders and those desiring to represent them."
It thereby serves to destroy the abuse at which § 14(a) was aimed, viz., the
control of huge corporations by a handful of people. 7 Such an interpretation
can only serve to facilitate attempts of the SEC and, as already noted, those
of private individuals and corporations, to protect the investing public against
misleading statements. In Okin, Judge Learned Hand indicated that no other
interpretation was practical, for if this interpretation were not adopted:
... an easy way would be open to circumvent the statute; one need only
spread the misinformation adequately before beginning to solicit, and the
Commission would be powerless to protect shareholders. The earlier stages
in the execution of such a continuous purpose must be subject to regulation,
8
if the purpose of Congress is to be fully carried out.3

Judge Hand's opinion has been cited with approval in a number of later
decisions." For, "no one should be allowed to influence the decision of stockholders in a proxy fight by the use of false or misleading material regardless
of whether that material is embodied in the particular form specifically made
subject to the Commission's regulation ....,40
Accepting this idea, there is no problem in classifying efforts to secure
necessary requests to require the calling of a special meeting as solicitations
within the scope of the Proxy Rules. In such an event, the SEC would follow
the same procedure as with an "ordinary" solicitation of proxies.4 1 The solicitation of an authorization to examine a shareholders' list is even more closely
related to what is considered an "ordinary" solicitation of proxies. However, the
principle set forth in Okin seems to have been extended beyond what was in
the immediate contemplation of Judge Hand. Thus, it has been held that the
circularization of stockholders for financial contributions to a stockholders' protective committee constitutes a solicitation of an authorization within the mean36 See Halsted v. SEC, 182 F.2d 660, 662 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 834 (1950).
37 SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
847 (1948).
38 SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943).
39 E.g., Rosen v. Alleghany Corp., 133 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); SEC v. Topping,

85 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
40 Rosen v. Alleghany Corp., 133 F. Supp. 858, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).

41 ARANow & EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 70 (1957). The
authors go on to explain:
... the individual or committee undertaking to solicit requests for a special meeting
must furnish a statement which meets the applicable disclosure and form requirements
imposed with regard to the use of a proxy statement in the ordinary solicitation of
proxies for an annual meeting.
In addition, the Commission has required the person or committee soliciting
requests for a special meeting to make a statement that, if sufficient requests are
received to require the call of the special meeting, that person or committee will
undertake formally to solicit proxies from the stockholders to accomplish the purposes
for which the meeting was called.
If the SEC Proxy Rules are applicable, the form of request which will be
solicited from the stockholders must be filed with the Commission in preliminary
and definitive form, in the same way as all other solicitation materials are required
to be filed.
Id. at 70-71 (Footnotes omitted).
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ing of § 12(e) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act4 2 The method used
for the solicitation is unimportant. Section 14(a) applies where one solicits
through the use of the mails, through any instrumentality of interstate commerce,
"or otherwise." Copies of soliciting material in the form of speeches or scripts for
radio and television, although they need not be filed prior to use, must be filed
afterwards. 3
The cases indicate, however, that in order for there to be a cause of action
under § 14(a), there must be some allegation of an intent to actually solicit
proxies a" This results in a twofold test to determine the existence of a solicitation.
One must first determine whether the communication is reasonably calculated
to result in the procurement, revocation, or withholding of a proxy. Then it
must be shown that the sender of the communication actually intended to solicit
proxies.4 Thus, not all communications to security holders are subject to the
rules and regulations of the SEC. Certain activities have been regarded as
"clearly" not amounting to a solicitation within the scope of § 14(a) and the
Proxy Rules.4"
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the court in Studebaker properly
placed the solicitation of authorizations to examine a shareholders' list within
the scope of § 14(a). This was a valid application of the broad principle first
laid down in Okin and subsequently approved. The writings in Studebaker
were clearly part of a continuous plan ending in a solicitation, and they prepared the way for its success.
The problems involving the corporate right to sue and the scope of § 14(a)
were disposed of by the Second Circuit with relative ease. Far greater difficulty
was involved when the court addressed itself to the injunction issue. Since this
was an action brought in a federal district court by Studebaker to enjoin
respondent Gittlin from using, in a state court proceeding, authorizations obtained in violation of the Proxy Rules, a question arose as to the applicability of
28 U.S.C. § 2283, the Federal Anti-Injunction Statute. This statute provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress,
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its judgments.
This limitation upon the power of the federal courts, though the wording has
varied over the years, has remained substantially the same from the beginning
of our nation's history. It expresses an important policy decision of the early
Congress, which recognized the problems that would arise if federal courts began
42
43

Halsted v. SEC, 182 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 834 (1950).

HENN, CORPORATIONs 463 (1961).
44 See SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784 "(2d Cir. 1943); SEC v. Topping, 85 F. Supp. 63
(S.D.N.Y. 1949) (by implication).
45 ARANow & EINHORN, op. cit. supra note 41, at 91.
46 Among these are: the distribution of semiannual and quarterly reports, communications

containing information and comments concerning business of the character normally sent to
stockholders by the corporate management during the course of the fiscal year, the furnishing
of a form of proxy to a security holder on his unsolicited request, and the publication by a
newspaper of news stories quoting contending parties or containing editorial comments. 2
Loss, op. cit. supra note 5, at 872-73.
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to interfere in state court proceedings. The statute was enacted to prevent the
needless friction between state and federal courts bound to occur if the latter
were permitted to give free rein to their equity powers."7
Section 2283 has been strictly interpreted. An injunction will not issue
unless one of its stated exceptions clearly exists. Section 2283 was "not a statute
conveying a broad general policy for appropriate ad hoc application. Legislative
policy is here expressed in a clear-cut prohibition qualified only by specifically
defined exceptions." 4 The prohibition of the section was "not to be whittled
'
away by judicial improvisation." 49
There is, thus, a clear judicial tendency to
interpret the statute as preventing the use of the injunction by federal courts
in all but a few narrowly defined situations.
Accordingly, though the statute forbids an injunction to stay proceedings
in a state court, the injunction need not be directed at the state court itself.
To come within the scope of § 2283, it is sufficient that there merely be an attempt to restrain one of the parties to the proceedings."0
In support of the validity of the injunction against Gittlin, Studebaker
contended that § 2283 was inapplicable on the grounds that the injunction did
not "stay proceedings" in the state court even indirectly. Studebaker argued
that Gittlin was not prevented from continuing proceedings but was merely
forbidden to use the authorizations which had been improperly obtained. This
argument was rightly rejected by the Second Circuit. Though the state court
proceedings, strictly speaking, were not stayed, since the district court's order
had enjoined a necessary step in the proceedings, it came within the scope of
§ 2283."' More specifically, § 2283 will prevent any order of a federal court which
necessarily has the effect of restraining proceedings in a state court unless one
of the stated exceptions applies.52
This tendency to interpret the statute against action by the federal courts
can be seen in other ways also. Since the statute forbids the federal courts to stay
"proceedings," the term "proceedings" has been defined very broadly.
It includes all steps taken or which may be taken in the state court or
by its officers from the institution to the close of the final process. It
applies to appellate as well as to original proceedings; and is independent
of the doctrine of res judicata. It applies alike to action by the court and
by its ministerial officers; applies not only to an execution issued on a
judgment, but to any proceeding supplemental or ancillary taken with a
view to making the suit or judgment effective. The prohibition is applicable
whether such supplementary or ancillary proceeding
is taken in the court
5
which rendered the judgment or in some other. 3
47 Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4 (1939); H. J. Heinz
Co. v. Owens, 189 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 905 (1952).
48 Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 515-16 (1955).
49 Id. at 514.
50 See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 288 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1961); Furnish v. Board
of Medical Examiners, 257 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 882 (1958); H. J.
Heinz Co. v. Owens, 189 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 905 (1952).
Cases interpreting § 265 of the Judicial Code (Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 265, 36 Stat.
1162), the predecessor of § 2283, have held the same way. E.g., Oklahoma Packing Co. v.
Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4 (1939); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Consumers Fin. Serv.,
Inc., 101 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1938).
51 See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 288 F.2d 245, 247-48 (2d Cir. 1961).
52 Harrison v. Triplex Gold Mines, Ltd., 33 F.2d 667 (1st Cir. 1929).
53 Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935)
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Furthermore, § 2283 literally applies only to the granting of an injunction and
does not deal with less drastic remedies. However, it has been held that the
underlying policy of the statute is a valid basis for denying a declaratory judgment in instances where an injunction would be unavailable because of the
statute."
The court in Studebaker was forced to determine if an injunction could
be granted under one of the three listed exceptions to § 2283. More specifically,
the Second Circuit sought to determine whether an injunction can be regarded
as "expressly authorized by Act of Congress" in light of § 21(e) of the SEA.
This section provides that:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged
or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the provisions of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation thereunder, it may in its discretion bring an action .. to enjoin such
temporary
acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or
injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond.55
The exact meaning of the term "expressly authorized" is unclear. Section
265 of the Judicial Code of 1911,5" the predecessor of present-day § 2283, prohibited injunctions to stay proceedings in state courts "except in cases where
such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in
bankruptcy." Subsequent acts of Congress which apparently authorized the use
of the injunction in cases other than bankruptcy were construed to have impliedly
amended the statute, so that a number of additional exceptions grew up.5"
In enacting § 2283, Congress substituted the generalized phrase "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress." This phrase was designed to recognize
the various statutory exceptions that had been accomplished without expressly
amending the prior anti-injunction statute.5
It is clear that no prescribed formula is required for express authorization
and that an authorization need not expressly refer to § 2283.51 It is unclear,
however, whether express authorization can be found where a statute merely
6
confers a general power to enjoin. A section of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 0
for example, was interpreted as not permitting a stay of state court proceedings.
In this act, the injunctive remedy had been authorized only by a general grant,
and the creation of general equity jurisdiction was not regarded as sufficient to
bring the act within the exceptions to § 2283. In the eyes of the Fourth Circuit,
the act did not suggest that relief was to include an injunction forbidden by an54 H. J. Heinz Co. v.Owens, 189 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 905
(1952).

55 48 Stat. 900 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964).

56 Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 265, 36 Stat. 1162.
57 Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 384
U.S. 890 (1966), lists those statutory exceptions which were fully established by 1941. These'
statutes include the Removal Acts, the statute providing for limitation of a shipowner's
liability, the Interpleader Act of 1926, and the Frazier-Lemke Act. 337 F.2d at 587-88.
58 Id. at 588.
59 Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511 (1955); Dilworth
v.Riner 343 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1965).
60 R v.STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
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other Act of Congress. 6 However, in Dilworth v. Riner, 2 Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 19646" was held to include just such relief. Part of the confusion
might be attributed to the lack of clarity in the phrase "general equity jurisdiction." The Fifth Circuit in Dilworth felt that the 1964 Act had conferred something more than general equity jurisdiction.
As stated above, § 265 of the Judicial Code was impliedly amended by subsequent acts of Congress which were interpreted to permit the enjoining of
state court proceedings in cases other than bankruptcy. One such act was the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.64 Under § 205(a) of this act, the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration was authorized to seek injunctive relief against violations of the act in much the same manner as the
SEC was authorized to seek an injunction under § 21 (e) of the SEA. In Bowles
v. Willingham,"5 when the Administrator sought to enjoin a state court proceeding brought to restrain the issuance of certain rent orders, § 205 (a) was
held to be sufficient authority for allowing the injunction. In Bowles, as in
Studebaker, the very act of prosecuting the state court action was a violation of
federal law. The sufficiency of § 205(a), with its broad grant of injunctive
power to a federal agent, as a basis for an exception to the prohibition of
§ 265 was affirmed two years later in Porter v. Dicken.6" It has been suggested
that the inapplicability of § 265 when the United States sought an injunction
to restrain state court proceedings (the same is true under § 2283 today) may
have influenced the decision in Porter, since the Price Administrator officially
represented the United States." In more recent years, again under statutory
provisions very similar to § 21 (e) of the SEA, the National Labor Relations
Board has been held "expressly authorized" to obtain a stay of state court
proceedings."8

61 Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 384 U.S.
890 (1966).
62 Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1965). The court in Dilworth distinguished
Baines on the ground that Baines involved the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which created no
right of the type involved in Dilworth, i.e., the right to be free from punishment for peacefully
claiming the right to equal public accommodation. Id. at 232.
63 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1964).
64 Ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (1942).
65 Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
66 328 U.S. 252 (1946).
67 Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 589 (4th Cir. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 384
U.S. 890.
68 Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511 (1955); International
Union of Elec. Workers v. Underwood Corp., 219 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1955). But see NLRB
v. Swift & Co., 233 F.2d 226, 230 (8th Cir. 1956).
The authorization has been found in the provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act, which provide in part:
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint as provided in
subsection (b) of this section charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any United States 'district court . . .
for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such
petition the court . . . shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary
relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper.
If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom the
matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that
a complaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any United
States district court ... for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication
of the Board with respect to such matter.
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In light of the foregoing, it seems clear that the court in Studebaker was
correct in its conclusion that § 2283 would not have forbidden an injunction
sought by the Commission itself. Professor Moore would agree with this analysis,"
even though Congressional intent to exempt actions70brought by an agency
from the limitations of the statute must clearly appear.
As noted above, Studebaker was not a case where an agency alone had the
light to seek an injunction. In such a situation it is correctly held that there
is no express authorization for an injunction to issue at the demand of private
individuals.71 Section 21(e), however, permits a private right of action. Such a
private right is a "necessary supplement" to enforcement of the Act by the SEC.
Since this is the case, where an injunction is regarded as expressly authorized if
sought by the Commission, it should be regarded as such when sought by a
private individual. It is submitted that the Second Circuit in Studebaker properly
disregarded as a barrier to granting the desired relief the fact that the injunction
was sought by a private individual.
The Second Circuit's interpretation of the phrase "expressly authorized by
Act of Congress" to include the situation before it was not a radical departure
from prior legal thought. On the contrary, such a reading is part of a very
logical progression based upon strong case precedent. However, this very progression developing out of the single phrase is expressive of a judicial trend that
conflicts with the historic attitude toward § 2283. It weakens the idea that the
prohibition of the statute is not to be whittled away by judicial improvisation
and that courts are to scrupulously adhere to the statute's limitations. It is submitted that a continual broadening of this one exception could lead to the evils
the original statute was designed to prevent. While the Studebaker decision is
not a radical departure, it is a further step in this direction and enhances the
possibility that these harmful effects will materialize in the future.
Dennis C. Thelen

LABOR LAW AN EMPLOYER MAY CONDITION FUTURE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PRESENCE OF A CERTIFIED COURT REPORTER

Following a decision by the
National Labor Relations Board that it had failed to bargain in good faith,'
Southern Transport, Inc., conditioned all future collective bargaining conferences
with Truck Drivers and Helpers Local 568, Teamsters Union, on the presence of
IF SUCH A DEMAND IS MADE IN GOOD FArTH. -

National Labor Relations Act §§ 10(j), (1), added by 61 Stat. 149 (1947), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 160(j), (1) (1964).
69 1A MooRE, FFnAaL PaAcmcn, pt. 2, 110.2131l] (2d ed. 1961).
70 See generally NLRB v. Swift & Co., 233 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1956). Cf. Dilworth v.
Riner, 343 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1965).
71 Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511 (1955); International
Union of Elec. Workers v. Underwood Corp., 219 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1955).
1 Southern Transp., Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 615 (1963), enforced, 343 F.2d 558 (8th Cir.
1965). Specifically, the Board found that Southern had violated §§ 8(a) (1) and 8(a)'(5) of
the NLRA in its failure to schedule meetings with the union; to return union telephone calls;
to provide a negotiator when the approved one was unavailable; to furnish a copy of company
rules which it insisted upon including in the contract; to notify the union, after its certification,
of wage changes; and to bargain with the union on wages and economic benefits. Southern
Transp., Inc., supra at 617-18.
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a certified court reporter who would make a verbatim transcript of 'such negotiations. The company's request was based partially upon its belief that the Board
had erroneously decided certain issues of credibility in favor of the union. The
union refused to accede to the company's demand for a stenographer, and once
again charged Southern with a refusal to bargain in good faith in violation of
§§ 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act.' In a clarifying
statement to the Board, Southern stated that it was willing to assume the entire
cost of the transcript. However, it insisted that such transcript be mutually binding. Based upon its prior determination and the totality of Southern's conduct,
the Board held that Southern's insistence was not made in good faith but was
rather an attempt to further impede negotiations.' Board member Brown, concurring in this decision, asserted that Southern's demand was in itself a rejection
of the company's duty to bargain collectively. 4 On a petition to enforce the
Board's order, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied
enforcement and held: when there has been past dispute and litigation over what
was said by the parties during previous bargaining meetings, the party willing
to assume the expense may insist that a certified court reporter be present at
future negotiations to keep an accurate record, mutually binding upon and
available to both parties, if such a demand is made in good faith. NLRB v.
Southern Transp, Inc., 355 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1966).
The right of an employer to insist upon certain conditions precedent to his!
entering into, or continuing with, negotiations has generally been restricted to
those conditions which are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.' Accordingly, a participant in collective bargaining negotiations may lawfully force
to the point of an impasse only those proposals involving "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment," as provided in § 8(d) of the NLRA.6
In interpreting the requirement of this section, the NLRB has declared it unlawful for an employer to demand as a prerequisite to commencing or continuing
bargaining discussions that a union post a bond promising full performance of

2 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a) (1), 61 Stat. 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964), provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 7." Section 8(a) (5) of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act),
61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964), provides that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ... ." Defining this duty to bargain collectively under § 8(a) (5), § 8(d) Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964),
requires the employer and the representative of the employees "to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment ......
3 Southern Transp., Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 305 (1964). In this determination by the Board,
both parties waived the preliminary hearing before a trial examiner and brought the dispute
immediately to the Board.
4 Id. at 311 (concurring opinion).
5 E.g., NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); AllisChalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 213 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1954). While the scope of this article
will be limited to the legality of conditioning negotiations on the presence of a court reporter,
for an excellent discussion of the employer's duty to bargain in good faith in regard to those
subjects which the NLRB has considered mandatory aspects of collective bargaining, see
Fleming, The Changing Duty to Bargain, 14 LAB. L.J. 297 (1963).
6 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
158(d) (1964).
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its contract, terminate a lawful strike,' or sign a promise to refrain from degrading conduct during the negotiations with a monetary, penalty clause for
any infractions.9 These conditions, permissive subjects of 'collective bargaining,
do not pertain to terms and conditions of employment and thus may not be
I
insisted upon to the point of an impasse.
Shortly before its second order against Southern, the Board faced the questions of the legality of an employer's demand for a certified court reporter and
the right of an union to refuse such a demand in St. Louis Typographical Union
No. 8.10 In its collective bargaining sessions with the union, the Union Employers'
Section of the Graphic Arts Association of St. Louis, Inc., insisted that a court
stenographer be present to make a verbatim transcript of their meetings. While
this practice had been followed by the parties in the past, it had been abandoned
because the union felt that the employer had tailed to keep the contents of the
transcript secret. This same objection was raised by the union to the employer's
new demand in 1963." The maj6rity in St. Louis held that the union's adamant
refusal did not constitute an unfair labor practice since the union had taken its
position in good faith. 2 However, the minority, while concurring in the result,
objected to the majority's statement that the employer's insistence was also
made in good faith. 3 Board members Fanning and Brown reasoned that such1
a holding would allow "negotiations to flbunder before they even begin.'
They felt that allowing an employer to force a demand for a court reporter to
an impasse would have the effect of raising "to the status of mandatory collective bargaining those disagreements involving preliminary arrangements for
or the mechanics of bargaining."1 Since the employer's proposal in no way
involved terms or conditions of employment, the minority held that its insistence
on a stenographic transcript of negotiations as a precondition for any future
meetings constituted "an undermining of the collective-bargaining relationship.' 1
In Southern, neither the Board nor the Eighth Circuit directly considered
this distinction 'between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining. The
General Counsel for the Board attempted to relate Southern's demand for a
court reporter to such preliminary bargaining matters as the time and place of
negotiations.' The Board in its order found that since Southern had previously
failed to meet with the union at reasonable times, the company's new proposal
was further evidence of an attempt to avoid: bargaining discussions.' When
7 E.g., Scripto Mfg. Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 411 (1941); Jasper Blackburn Products. Corp.,,.21
N.L.R.B. 1240 (1940).
8 E.g., Rice Lake Creamery Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 1270 (1961), enforced sub-nom., General
Drivers And Helpers Union, Local 662 v. NLRB, 302 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 827 '(1962); Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co., 28 N.L.R.B. 847 (1941).
9 Newberry Equipment Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 747 (1962).1
10 149 N.L.R.B. 750 (1964).
11 Id. at 750-51.
12 Id. at 752. In reaching this conclusion, the Board pointed to the excellent bargaining
history between the employer and the union, to the reason why the verbatim transcript had
previously been abandoned by them, and to the inhibiting effects which the union in good faith
believed would be exacted upon its negotiators by a stenographer's presence.
13 Id. at 753-54 (concurring opinion).
14 Id. at 753.
15

Ibid.

16
17
18

Id. at 754.
Brief for Petitioner, p. 9.
Southern Transp., Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 305, 308 (1964).

'
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these approaches are compared with the Board's statement in St. Louis that
parties to negotiations should be allowed to resolve their differences over preliminary matters in the same manner that they resolve disagreements over substantive terms or conditions,19 it appears that the Board has elevated an employer's demand for a court reporter to the status of a mandatory bargaining
subject.
Prior to St. Louis, the NLRB had dealt with the court stenographer issue
on three occasions. The earliest instance was in Reed & Prince Mfg. Co.2"
There, the Board found the company guilty of numerous unfair labor practices,
and among the litany of offenses it included the employer's demand that a court
reporter be present at its bargaining sessions. 1 The Board reasoned that such
a proposal was not the normal procedure adopted by a party claiming
to be bargaining in good faith. Rather, such a demand was considered
to be "more consistent with the building of a defense to anticipated refusal to
bargain charges." 2 This insistence was viewed as further evidence of the company's bad faith.22 Although the First Circuit adopted the ultimate conclusion
of the Board,24 it made this significant statement:
[W]e are not inclined to agree with the Board that the Company's insistence,
over the Union's strenuous objection, on having a stenotypist present at
all the bargaining meetings to take down a verbatim transcript of the
proceedings was evidence of the Company's bad faith.2 5
Following Reed, the Board briefly considered an employer's demand for
a court reporter in Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co."8 and East Tex. Steel Castings Co. 2
In Allis-Chalmers, the Board felt that the company had bargained in good faith
in requesting a verbatim transcript of the bargaining conferences since it was
willing to assume the expense involved, offered to furnish the union with a copy
of the transcript, and eventually dismissed the stenographer because of the union
attorney's strenuous objections. 28 Likewise, in East Texas, the Board held that
the company's use of a stenographer at its bargaining sessions was not indicative
of bad faith since the employer's overall bargaining pattern did not militate
against free expression by the parties involved.29
The opinions of the Board in these earlier cases were crystalized and thoroughly explained by the majority in St. Louis. In essence, the Board currently
holds that an employer's request for a court reporter is not illegal per se and
will not in itself constitute a basis for finding a refusal to bargain in good faith.
19 St. Louis Typographical Union, No. 8, 149 N.L.R.B. 750, 752 (1964).
20 96 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951).
21 Id. at 854. Some of the other charges lodged by the Board against the company were:
delay in scheduling meetings and furnishing the union with data on wages and services; refusal
to bargain on the subject of a union checkoff provision; and the unilateral grant of a wage increase after an impasse had been reached.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887

(1953).
25
26
27
28
29

Id. at 139 '(dictum).
106 N.L.R.B. 939 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 213 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1954).
108 N.L.R.B. 1078 (1954).
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 939, 950 (1953).
East Tex. Steel Castings Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1078 (1954).
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Rather, the totality of the party's conduct in demanding the reporter will be
examined. If the Board determines that an employer has not attempted to evade
his legal duty to bargain, his demand for a court reporter will be permitted.
As the Board clearly stated in St. Louis:
It is not our intention here either to endorse or condemn the practice of
utilizing a stenographer during bargaining negotiations. Rather, in this
matter we shall undertake to determine only whether, in assuming its
position, the Respondent acted in a manner consistent with the principles
of good-faith bargaining required by the Act.30
Board members Fanning and Brown, who expressed their opposition to the
presence of a court stenographer at the bargaining table in St. Louis, justified
their belief that such a demand was conclusive evidence of bad faith on several
grounds. They asserted that a stenographer's presence tends to inhibit a party's
ability to negotiate effectively. They maintained that a demand for a verbatim
transcript made at the very outset of negotiations generates suspicion and distrust. Fanning and Brown further contended that such a situation will "encourage negotiators to concentrate upon and speak for the purpose of making
a record rather than directing their efforts toward a solution of the issues before
them.""1

There are divergent views on the advisability of a court reporter being
present at the bargaining table. 2 The detractors point out that a verbatim record impedes the free give-and-take of negotiations, necessitating numerous
"off the record" discussions. Likewise, bitter disagreements have arisen over the
interpretation of the transcript itself. Probably the most cogent statement against
the use of reporters was made by the Senator Wayne Morse during a hearing
before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations.
Senator Morse commented: "I cannot think of anything that would discourage
good-faith bargaining, more than to think that every word that was being spoken
was being taken down as you maneuvered for position.... ""
In Southern, the Eighth Circuit adopted and enlarged upon the current
majority holding of the Board. Since the First Circuit's statement in Reed concerning a stenographer's presence was dictum rather than law , Southern was
the first case in which a federal court squarely faced the issue of whether or not
an employer's demand that a certified court reporter be present at future bargaining negotiations amounted to a refusal to bargain in good faith. Agreeing that
the demand for a reporter was not illegal per se, the Eighth Circuit found that a
prior determination of Southern's bad faith did not in itself constitute substantial
evidence to sustain the Board's present findings that Southern had continued
30
31
32
during
HEALY,

149 N.L.R.B. at 752 (1964).
Id. at 754 (concurring opinion).
For a general discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing a court reporter
negotiations, see CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 85-86 (1951); SLICHTER,
& LIVERNASH,

THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON
BARGAINING WITH ORGANIZED LABOR, 46-48

(1960); SMYTH & MURPHY,

MANAGEMENT,

938

(1948).

33 Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on Reed & Prince Mfg. Co. Labor Dispute,
82d Cong., Ist Sess. 101 (1951).
34

See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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to avoid negotiations. The court felt that it w.s also incumbent upon the Board
to show an improper motive on Southern's part in demanding a court stenographer. 5 To substantiate its position, the Eighth Circuit elucidated certain policy
considerations. Since the previous bargaining conferences between Southern and
the union had been conducted without the presence of a court reporter, the
Board's first determination against Southern was based upon the testimony of
company and union officials as to what orally transpired at these meetings. As
a result, Southern contended that the Board had unfavorably decided certain
issues of credibility. Therefore, the company argued that it could only vindicate
its position that an impasse had been reached in the bargaining negotiations by
having a stenographer present at future meetings to record its proposals.38 In
accepting this contention, the Eighth Circuit pointed to the dilemma confronting
Southern. Having been previously found guilty of bargaining in bad faith, the
company, absent the availability of a record, was faced with the alternative of
acceding to the union's demands or remaining steadfast in its position that an
impasse had been reached at the risk of a second 8(a) (5) charge and a possible
contempt of court citation. If the latter occurred, the parties would find themselves embroiled in another "swearing match" with little doubt as to the outcome.
The use of verbatim transcript would allow both the Board and -courts to
transcend the frequently biased testimony of company and union negotiators and,
hence, to arrive at a more accurate factual determination of what transpired at
the bargaining table. As the Southern court noted, "The Board so recently accepting the position of the Union could hardly be expected to find for Respondent. A record would eliminate much of the difficulty of this dilemma.""7 Only
in this manner will it be possible to obtain a more precise form of justice..
The arguments that a reporter's presence would inhibit the free interchange
of ideas and generate a feeling of distrust were correctly rejected by the court
in Southern. On the contrary, the court reasoned that any serious objections to
the use of a stenographer would be raised only by the party who was bargaining
in bad faith since he alone Would not want the Board to be furnished with a
transcript of his position. Consequently, where there has been past disagreement
over what transpired at collective bargaining negotiations, a record would "serve
as the basis for instilling mutual trust and respect rather than causing a wider
divergence between the parties," 9 and "would be a positive force for good faith
negotiations."4 0 In addition to these advantages, those negotiators supporting
35 The court reasoned that if the Board were allowed to base a subsequent finding of bad
faith solely on a prior and similar determination, the result would be to place the guilty party
in an unequal bargaining position with the other negotiators. This in turn would lead to onesided agreements. Moreover, if a prior finding of bad faith was in itself sufficient, the court
felt that
the Board would thereafter be armed with all the evidence necessary to sustain its
position in future holdings against this party. The courts would be virtually removed
from the scene and the party, deprived of judicial protection, would thereafter be at
the mercy of an overzealous Board.
NLRB v. Southern Transp., Inc., 355 F.2d 978, 981-82 (8th Cir. 1966).
36 Brief for Respondent, pp. 4, 8. On the other hand, the Board contended that its first
determination was based primarily on uncontradicted evidence. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 7, 11.
37 NLRB v. Southern Transp., Inc., 355 F. 2d 978, 985 (8th Cir. 1966).
38 Ibid.
39 Id. at 984.
40 Id. at 985.
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the 'use of a verbatim tianscript point out that it enables 'the bargaining' conferences to be conducted in a 'dignified manner and eliminates numerous disagreements over what the parties meant by a specific clause in their contract."
The decision in Southern is susceptible to several different applications.
Since the Board's previous rulings dealing with an eiiployer's demand for-a
verbatim record did not involve a prior adjudication of bad faith and a subsequent insistence upon a stenographer at future meetings, the Eighth Circuit's
ruling could be narrowly construed to apply only to such similar situation.
However, in light of St. Louis, such'a construction is unlikely. The Board has
implicitly declared that an employer's proposal for a repoiter's presence is a
mandatory subject of 'collective bargaining. It 'is submitted 'that if the Board
intends to follow this course in the future, it should be explicit. The minority's
argument that such a position frustrates negotiations before they even begin is
persuasive. However, the inherent difficulty in both' approaches is the attempt
to categorize the demand for a court reporter as a mandatorq subject of bargaining within the scope of § 8(d)'of the NLRA. Argdiably, such a proposal pertains
orily to the preliminary sieps of collective bargaining. On 'the other hand, it has
a tangential' relationship to those' mandatory subjects, since a verbatim
transcript evinces what the parties said concerning wages, hours, and other terms of
employment. Unlike matters of time and place, a written record deals with
I
the entire bargaining process.
It is submitted, that the ruling in Southern should be given a liberal construction, permitting 'an employer to insist upon the presence of a certified court
reporter at any time he in good faith believes 6ne'is necessary. If the union is
unwilling to share the ext"enses involved, the employer must assume the entire
cost' Moreover, in order ti'avoid the breakdown of negotiations at the outset,
if the 'employer's demand 'i made in good faith, 'the union should not be permttted to refuse. This is essentially the position that the trial examiner in St. Louis
4 2
would have taken were it 'not for the Board's prior determination in Reed.
The advantages of mutual trust. a positive force for good-faith bargaining; the
protection of the employer's position; and the attainment of more accurate
justice would also accrue to the union.
Michael S. Williamson

CONSTITUTIONAL 'LAWACT PROHIBITING PAY TV IN THE HOME Is INVALID AS ABRIDGMENT OF FREE SPEE CH GUARANTEES OF STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONS. In the November 1964 general election, the California

electorate, by initiative, adopted the Free Television Act.' This Act banned
41 CHA BERLAiN, op. cit. supra note 32, at 85-86; SmYTH & MURPHY, op. 'cit. supra'note
32, at 46-47.
42 In his opinion, Trial Examiner Frederick Reel stated, "[Als an original proposition, I
would be inclined to sustain the complaint [against the union] and find that one party to the
negotiations cannot lawfully condition its readiness to negotiate on the absende"of'a court

reporter." St. Louis Typographical Union No. 8, 149 N.L.R.B. 750, 758 ,(1964).
added.)

,

, -

I

(Emphasis

1 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 43-1 - 43-7. The Act passed by a voteof 4,515,013 to 2,286,775.
Note, Aspects of Pay Television: Regulation, ConstitutionalLaw, Antitrust, 53 CALIF. L. REV.
,1
1378 n.1 (1965).
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the business of home subscription television, commonly called Pay TV. After
the Act had been adopted, plaintiffs, who desired to engage in the subscription television business, attempted to file articles of incorporation with the
California Secretary of State. When the Secretary of State refused to file these
articles on the grounds that they were proscribed by provisions of the Free Television Act, 2 plaintiffs brought suit for declaratory relief. They contended that
the Act violated free speech guarantees of both federal and state constitutions and
that, therefore, defendant should have accepted the articles. The Superior Court
of Sacramento County, in granting the desired relief, ruled that the Act unconstitutionally abridged both state and federal guarantees of free speech.2 In
a divided opinion, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the trial court's
ruling and held: the California Free Television Act is unconstitutional as an
abridgment of the free speech guarantees of state and federal constitutions.
Weaver v. Jordan, 411 P.2d 289, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1966).
The decision of the California Supreme Court in Weaver was the first
judicial ruling directly dealing with the constitutionality of a statutory attempt
to proscribe the business of pay television.4 As such, it will stand as a landmark
in the subscription television field. Subscription television is a profit-oriented
business which originates and transmits programs to persons who pay for such
service.5 In 1963, the California legislature formally gave its approval to pay
television.0 The Free Television Act of 1964' was an initiative measure which
repealed this prior legislative approval.
The campaign background behind the passage of this initiative measure
contributes to a better understanding of the interests involved and the actual intent of the Act. The origination and success of the initiative measure were due
mainly to the efforts of the Citizens Committee for Free TV. This committee
conducted a vigorous campaign, backed and financed by the nation's motion
picture theater owners.8 Theater owners and commercial television interests began
their drive to outlaw pay television when Subscription Television, Inc. (STV)
had sold more than $23 million worth of stock to establish a subscription television system in California.9 In the campaign to ban pay television, its opponents
See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 43-2- 43-4.
3 Weaver v. Jordan, No. 155760 Sacramento County Super. Ct., May 19, 1965.
4 Other cases involving pay television did not address themselves to this constitutional
issue. These decisions include Connecticut Comm. Against Pay TV v. FCC, 301 F.2d 835
(D.C. Cir. 1962); Independent Theater Owners, Inc. v. Arkansas Publ. Serv. Comm'n, 235
Ark. 668, 361 S.W.2d 642 '(1962).
5 For an excellent detailed analysis of pay television and its legal and technical aspects
see Note, 53 CALIF. L. REv., supra note 1.
6 "Section 35002 explicitly provides that 'A subscription television corporation shall have
authority to engage in the subscription television business in this State..... ' I Brief for Respondent, p. 3, Weaver v. Jordan, 411 P.2d 289, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1966).
2

7

CAL. Crv. CODE § 43-1.

8 The committee's war chest was estimated at $1,500,000. Smith, Pay or Free? The
Coming TV War, The Nation, May 18, 1964, pp. 504-06. Opponents of Free Television Act
included: Subscription Television, Inc., headed by Sylvester L. Weaver; Los Angeles Times;
Los Angeles Mayor Sam Yorty; Screen Actors' Guild and Actors' Equity, whose presidents,
Dana Andrews and Ralph Bellamy, were elected co-chairmen of "The Entertainment Industry
Comm. to Obtain a Fair Trial for Pay TV." Proponents of the Act included: California Crusade for Free TV; The Citizens Comm. for Free TV; San Francisco Mayor John F. Shelley;
The Federated Women's Clubs of California; and the labor councils of San Francisco and San
Mateo, Sacramento and Alameda counties. Newsweek, March 23, 1964, p. 92.
9 Battling Big Odds for Pay TV, Business Week, June 27, 1964, p. 146. Subscription
Television, Inc., is an ambitious undertaking to produce a successful and highly profitable pay
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sought to create a belief that pay television would destroy "free" commercial
television.1" By midsummer of 1964, opponents of pay television had amassed
petitions with 675,431 certified signatures. 1
Heavy economic factors weighed on both sides of the campaign to outlaw
pay television. Subscription Television, Inc., had been capitalized at $23 million. 2 Most of this money had already been spent before the Act's passage.
Following adoption of the Act, STV stock value plunged from an initial offering
of $12 per share to less than $4 per share. STV president, Sylvester Weaver,
estimated that of $20.2 million which had been spent by STV in California for
development, programming equipment and other supplies, $13.4 million could
not be recovered unless STV were allowed to operate again in the state.' Thus,
STV had sound financially inspired reasons to fight the Act.
Subscription television may be transmitted by two different methods. Each
method has different legal consequences. If programs are transmitted by airwaves, the company must "scramble" the programs so that only subscribers-whose
television sets are equipped with complex decoding devices can receive the programs as transmitted. This system can transmit only one program at a time and
is subject to the control of the Federal Communications Commission which regulates all airwave frequencies. 4 A second method of transmission is by closed-circuit
systems which use a coaxial cable distribution grid to transmit programs. The
closed-circuit system is able to offer as many as three or more programs simultaneously 5 The FCC has not assumed control over closed-circuit pay television
like that exercised over the airwave system. Since the cost of easements and
conduits for laying cable is too expensive, most closed-circuit systems rent or lease
existing telephone lines.' STV is a closed-circuit system which has three channels
television system. It is headed by Sylvester L. Weaver, advertising executive and onetime
president of NBC. Weaver foresees a million subscribers by the early 1970's. He estimates this
will mean new jobs for 38,000 workers, an annual payroll over $315 million and a capital investment near $170 million. Weaver, Jr., Why Suppress Pay-TV? The Fight in California,
The Atlantic Monthly, Oct., 1964, p. 59.
10 Speaking at the Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters' convention, Governor Leroy Collins, president of NAB, warned, "Eventually pay television could actually destroy free television as we
know it today." The Nation, supra note 8, at 504. In Beverly Hills ushers presented petitions
as they led moviegoers to their seats, while on the screen flashed the message: "Sign the petition ... Keep TV free in the home." Newsweek, supra note 8, at 92.
There are three possible interpretations of the way that pay television may eventually emerge as a major broadcast medium. The most extreme is that pay TV will
destroy commercial television, in which case the viewing public might eventually have
to pay for very much the same programs it now sees free (i.e., sponsored). The most
rosy view... is that pay TV would give viewers a genuine choice. By satisfying sizable
minority audiences, and leaving the mass audience alone, pay TV may broaden everybody's enjoyment. The middle, and probably correct, view is that pay television will
emerge in neither the black robe suggested by the opposition, nor the shining armor
so winningly promised by pay television's backers. The Nation, supra note 8, at 505.
11 Business Week, supra note 9, at 142.
12 Id. at 146.
13 Pay-TV Set for Wake, Refuses to Lie Down, Business Week, Nov. 14, 1964, p. 34.
14 48 Stat. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1964).
15 Note, CALIF. L. REV., supra note 1, at 1381.
16
Actually, the pay-TV question was subject to public review only because STV
uses telephone lines, a public utility. Last year the California Public Utilities Commission approved STV's contract with the Pacific Telephone Co., and the state assembly passed needed tax legislation. According to California law, any public issue
can be decided on an election ballot if 8 per cent of the state's voters sign a petition
to put it there. Time, Nov. 13, 1964, p. 72.
,
See also Independent Theater Owners, Inc. v. Arkansas Publ. Serv. Comm'n, 235 Ark. 668,
361 S.W.2d 642 (1962).
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available for simultaneous programming. Subscribers are billed for the programs
they watchby an electronic interrogator which periodically transmits coded
signals back to the sender through the distribution grid.
A recent development which may have a significant impact on pay television has been the establishment of community antenna television systems
(CATV). CATV is a booster service which brings clear signals to homes beyond
the normal reach of existing television stations. Signals from commercial stations
are amplified through the use of microwave relay stations or captured by high
antennas and retransmitted by cable to local subscribers."7 Since the FCC has
not yet assumed control over closed-circuit television, it presently does nothaye
any control over closed-circuit pay television. Thus, there was no conflict between
present federal law and the California Act. In 1965, however, the FCC ruled
that it would assume jurisdiction over all CATV systems in the interest of orderly
broadcasting development.'" Since CATV and STV both operate on closedcircuit systems, there is every indication that the FCC may someday decide to
regulate closed-circuit pay television.
In 1959, the FCC agreed to accept applications for temporary pay television licenses in allocated test markets. 9 The FCC hoped to collect information
about pay television's impact on commercial television. Since 1959 only a few
experimental licenses for pay television have been granted2 0 All of these systems
have been airwave transmission systems. In Connecticut Comm. Against Pay
TV v. FCC,"' the United States Court of Appeals forthe District of Columbia
held that issuing pay television licenses was not outside the. FC's power since
such licenses were in the public interest 22 Thus, had the California Free Television Act been upheld, it might very well have come into conflict with future
FCC action. 8
The California Supreme Court, in Weaver, held that although pay television is subject to reasonable regulation, it cannot be completely proscribed.2
While the Weaver majority chose to view the Act as a violation of freedom of
speech, Justice Mosk, in his dissent, preferred to view it as a valid exercise of
the state's police power to regulate business in the public interest.2" Despite. the
17 Note, CALF. L. RnV., supra note 1, at 1384.
18 , 1 F.C.C.2d 453 (1965). See also Note, CAmiF. L. REv., supra note 1, at 1388.
19 26 F.C.C. 265 (1959).
20 WHCT in Hartford, Conn., was the first to get a test license. It began programming
on June 29, 1962, and is still operating, although it is losing money daily. Theater attendance
there has not suffered because WHCT has only 4,300 subscribers. Another test is going on in
Etobicoke, Ont., Canada, but it has only 3,000 subscribers. A second license was granted to
station KTVR in Denver on Oct. 3, 1962. A third applicant, KVUE in Sacramento, was
turned down as unacceptable for failure to comply with the conditions for trial operations. See
Note, CALIF. L. REv., supra note 1, at 1387 n.48 and Newsweek, supra note 8, at 92.
21 301 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
22 Id. at 838.
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, states in part "The Congress shall have the power . . . to
regulate commerce. .. among the several States .... "; The supremacy clause of art. VI makes
federal law supreme over all conflicting state enactments.
24 If it were necessary to regulate pay television, it could be done without total prohibition.
Hours of transmission, the number of channels in any one area, and the types of programs
broadcast could easily be regulated. Brief for Respondent, p. 22.
25
As I see it, however, my associates are vanquishing an illusory, adversary. The
target here is not speech; it is merely a matter, of dollars and cents and the power of
the people of the state to decide who gets them. 411 P.2d 289, 299, 49 Cal. Rptr.
537, 547 (1966) (dissent).
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dissent's coitentions to the contrary, communication and expression were directly involved in the Free Television Act. Communication by television is protected by constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press28 Although
state governments can properly use the police power to regulate business,2 such
state action may not'encroach upon first amendment freedom. 2 8
The trend in Supreme Court decisions has been that first amendment freedoms enjoy a "preferred position." 2 Any prior restraints on freedom of expression bear a heavy presumption against their validity.!' The California Supreme
Court in Weaver followed this trend. It recognized that the Free Television Act,
in prohibiting home subscription television, muzzled a medium of speech. The
Weaver dissent argued that since the "Act goes only to the element of compensation, [and] not to the right of expression, the First Amendment is irTeldevint
in the case at hand."'" However, by proscribing payment for programs, the Act
effectively put an end to the business of pay television.
In Near v. Minnesota,2 the Supreme Court noted that "in 'passing up6n
constitutional questions the court has regard to substance and not to mere matters of forni, and that, in accordance with familiar principles, the.statute must
be tested by its operation and effect."3 3 In 1Weaver, the California Supreme
Court heeded this admonition and peered beyond the mere form of the Free
Television Act. The Court found that in substance the Act went not only to
the element of compensation, but also to the right of expression and its content.
Pay television provides a unique selection of programs not available on commercial television,"' By outlawing pay television, a particular kind of, speech was
being restricted."
Courts do not close their eyes to first amendment issues merely because a
statute purports to regulate business. In Near, a state statute characterized the
publication of malicious, scandalous and defamatory matter as a business. An
26 E.g., Rumely v. United States, 197 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1952); American Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd on other grounds'sub nom.
FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954).
27 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
28 See e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233 (1936); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
29 E.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938). But see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-97 '(1949). See generally MASON & BEANEY,
AM ERIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 475-90 (1964).
30 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S.
58 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
31 Weaver v. Jordan, 411 P.2d 289, 300, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 548 (1966) (dissent).
32 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
33 Id. at 708.
34 Subscription Television, Inc., planned a range of programs which included: the latest
plays from Broadway: off-Broadway shows; summer stock; musicals and revues; classic modern
operas; music from Mozart to Bartok, from Puccini to Wagner to Verdi; world-famous D'Ogly
Carte Opera Co.; Bolshoi Ballet; Royal Ballet; Leningrad Kirov Ballet; and specialized national
dance groups such as Antonio & Les Ballets de Madrid, Moiseyev Dance Co., Ballet Folklorico
of Mexico; lectures including such speakers as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and William Laurence.
Weaver, Jr., supra note 9, at 58.
35 Brief of International Telemeter Corp. as Amicus Curiae, p. 7, Weaver ,v. Jordan,
411 P.2d 289, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1966), argued:
[J]udged by its operation and effect, as distinguished from its motivation as expressed in Section 2 of the statute, the Act suppresses free speech, the business of
supplying news, views and entertainment via the proscribed medium and, last, but far
from least, the right of the viewing public to listen, to hear and to see.
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attempt was then made to abate the business as a nuisance. The Supreme
Court recognized the statute as a veiled effort to restrict freedom of speech and
press.3
If the Free Television Act had been declared constitutional, the door would
have been opened for other campaigns to legislate competing businesses out of
existence. Thus, subscription newspapers and magazines could be legislated out
of business in favor of commercially sponsored papers; FM radio in favor of
AM radio; and motion pictures and radio in favor of television. It can be
argued that Justice Mosk's dissent in Weaver "confuses the means of suppression
with the fact of suppression." 3 Even the FCC, which regulates the broadcasting
industry through licensing, does not have the power to suppress news or other
opinion unrelated to the regulation of business.
In Grosjean v. American Press Co.,"9 the United States Supreme Court held
that a statute imposing a two percent tax upon the gross receipts of newspapers
which charged for advertising and had a weekly circulation of over 20,000 copies
was unconstitutional as an abridgment of first amendment rights. The court in
Weaver quoted with approval Mr. Justice Sutherland's language in Grosjean
which distinguishes between regulating business and unconstitutionally abridging
freedom of speech:
The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money from the
pockets of the appellees. If that were all, a wholly different question would
be presented. It is bad because, in the light of its history and of its present
setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax
to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue
of the constitutional guarantees. A free press stands as one of the great
interpreters between the government
and the people. To allow it to be fet40
tered is to fetter ourselves.

Freedom of speech was at issue in Weaver, even though that speech was
being sold. The fact that pay television is profit-oriented is immaterial. Supreme
Court decisions have long upheld freedom of speech in cases where profit was

being made from the speech.4" Not only does the right of free speech apply to the
content of expression but also to its dissemination.42

The majority opinion in Weaver astutely and appositely applies two seemingly opposing cases, relied upon by both plaintiff and defendant. In Breard v.
Alexandria,43 the Supreme Court held that a city ordinance which proscribed
36 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 720 (1931).
37 This possibility was suggested in brief of International Telemeter Corp. as Amicus
Curiae, p. 9.
38 Id. at 10.
39 297 U.S. 233 (1936).

40

Id. at 250.

41 E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Burstyn v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952) ; Katzev v. Los Angeles County, 52 Cal. 2d 360, 341 P.2d 310 (1959).
42 Wollam v. City of Palm Springs, 59 Cal. 2d 276, 379 P.2d 481, 486, 29 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6
(1963) stated:
The right of free speech necessarily embodies the means used for its dissemination
because the right is worthless in the absence of a meaningful method of its expression.
To take the position that the right of free speech consists merely of the right to be free
-from censorship of the content rather than any protection of the means used, would,
if carried to its logical conclusion, eliminate the right entirely.
43 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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magazine and other solicitors from knocking at doors unless previously- invited
did not violate the first amendment. "Green River" ordinances are common in
many cities."' They are passed by local governments to shield residents from
often annoying door-to-door salesmen. These ordinances are upheld or declared
unconstitutional depending upon the completeness of the statutory prohibition.
The key to the validity of Green River ordinances can be found by comparing Breardto Martin v. City of Struthers.45 In Martin, the statutory prohibi-

tion was complete. It did not exempt solicitors who were previously invited,
as did 'the ordinance in Breard. The Court, in declaring the City of Struthers
ordinance unconstitutional as a violation of the first amendment guarantee of
free speech, reasoned that those homeowners who desired to receive solicitors
ought to have that right.46 An unqualified prohibition would be a violation of
their guarantee of freedom of speech, which includes a right to listen.
Breard and Martin support a finding that the California Free Television
Act is unconstitutional. Pay television is invited into the home. It is not a salesman with his foot jammed in the door. It makes its appearance only if and when
the householder desires. It is submitted that if a consumer wishes to invite pay
TV into his house, he ought to have that right.
Similarly, the fact that the Free Television Act was adopted as an initiative
measure is not material. It was subject to the same review and restraints as if
it had been adopted by the state legislature. People who want subscription television should be able to have it.4" The very purpose and intent of the Bill of
Rights was to protect certain fundamental rights from the tyranny of the majority.
In the famous case of West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette," Mr. Justice

Jackson stated that more than a rational basis must support restrictions on first
amendment freedoms of speech, press, assembly and worship.
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach
of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech,
a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.49

(Emphasis added.)

44 For origination of the name "Green River ordinance" see Town of Green River v.
Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P.2d 456 (1936).
45 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
46 The Court noted the turning point of the ordinances:

For centuries it has been a common practice in this and other countries for

persons not specifically invited to go from home to home and knock on doors or ring

doorbells to communicate ideas to the occupants or to invite them to political, reli-

gious, or other kinds of public meetings. Whether such visiting shall be permitted has
in general been deemed to depend upon the will of the individual master of each
household, and not upon the determination of the community. Ibid. (Emphasis
added.)

47 Opponents of pay television assumed that it would appeal only to those who had the
money to subscribe to it and that free television would be put out of business, leaving the
economically less fortunate with no television. Speaking at the National Ass'n of Broadcasters'
annual convention in Chicago in 1964, NAB president, Leroy Collins, said, "America does not
need a class system in television based on ability to pay." Smith, supra note 8, at 504.
48 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

49 Id. at 638-39.
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Having determined that the Free Television Act encroached on freedom
of speech guarantees, the California Supreme Court stated that, the potential
unlimited scope of the restrictions could escape invalidity only if they protected the
public against a "clear and present danger" of a substantive evil which the state
has a right to prohibit.50 The clear and present danger test has received a great
deal of comment."' Although this test has not been precisely defined, nor uniformly applied,52 the Supreme Court has used it in a number of decisions involving restrictions upon free speech guarantees of the first amendment. 5 Perhaps part of the difficulty stems from inability to frame an accurate definition of
"clear and present danger." One of the most careful definitions of this phrase to
date was formulated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California:4 that
"no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the
incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there
is opportunity for full discussion."5 5 Thus, in order for legislation restricting the
free exercise of speech to be held constitutional, the evil sought to be avoided
by the statute must be substantial,serious and imminent.5 6
In Dennis v. United States,5 7 Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, announcing the
judgment of the Court, declared: "The doctrine that there must be a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent is a
judicial rule to be applied as a matter of law by the courts.,' In interpreting
the clear and present danger phrase, Dennis adopted the formula enunciated by
Chief Judge Learned Hand in the court below.59 Judge Hand had declared,
"In each case they [courts] must ask. whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary
to avoid the danger." 60 Thus, there is a twofold test in freedom of speech cases.
A court must first decide whether there is a serious, substantial and imminent
50 Weaver v. Jordan, 411 P.2d 289, 295, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 543 (1966). The "clear and
present danger" test was first formulated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919). In upholding the Espionage Act of 1917 as applied to the suppression of
certain antidraft leaflets, Holmes stated:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. Id. at 52.
51 See e.g., Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amrendment, 72 YALE
L. J. 877 '(1963); McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1182 (1959):
Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 313
(1952).
52 Compare Justice Holmes' language in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. -47, 52
(1919), with his dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919).
53 E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Bridges v. California, 314, U.S. 252
(1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
54 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
55 Id. at 377 (concurring opinion).
56 Examples of such evils generally involve some serious threat to the public peace or
safety. See, e.g., Dennis v.. United States, 341 U.S. 494 '(1951) (advocating overthrow of
the government by force and violence); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (danger of riot and internal disorder); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)
("When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with trafc upon the
public streets, or other immediate threats to public safety, peace, or order appears, the
power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious."); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919) (conspiracy to obstruct the draft).
57 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
58 Id. at 513.
59 Id. at 510.
60 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
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evil warranting the, abridgment of free speech guaranteed by the first amendment. It must then determine whether that evil is so serious and imminent as to
justify the means of abridgment."
In 1959 the California Supreme Court had applied the clear and present
danger test in Katzev v. County of Los Angeles."' This case involved an ordinance which prohibited the sale or circulation of crime comic books to any child
under the age of eighteen. The county board of supervisors attempted to suppress
these books on the ground that they destroy the moral fiber of children and
incite them to juvenile delinquency. The California' court, utilizing the Dennis
test, found no clear and present danger that the circulation of these crime books
would result in the alleged injurious effects. Consequently, the ordinance was
held to be an unconstitutional infringement of first amendment rights.
Consistent with their earlier opinion in Katzev, the California Supreme
Court applied the clear and present danger test to the facts in Weaver. Justice
Mosk argued in his dissent that the test was inapposite since the Free Television
Act was a general regulatory statute, not intended to control the content of
speech, and only an incidental limitation upon its unfettered exercise. 2 It is submitted that the Weaver majority correctly decided that the Free Television Act
did in fact suppress speech and its dissemination, not only indirectly but directly.
Thus, the sweeping suppression attempted by the Act was properly viewed as
not justified by the dangers Pay TV allegedly threatened to public peace or
safety.
Likewise, even if it were shown that pay television did present some danger
to the public benefits of commercial television, the Free Television Act should
have confined itself to correcting that danger. Employing the Dennis test, the
Act, to be constitutional, had to strike a balance between the means used and
the result hoped to be achieved. 3 However, the Act chose to impose the sanction
of outright prohibition on pay television in the home. It is submitted that there
are other means, less drastic than absolute prohibition to achieve the intended
regulation of the home subscription television business. State regulation of the
pay television field has not been totally foreclosed by the Weaver decision.
Weaver leaves states free to impose less stringent statutory measures. Since statutory regulation short of complete prohibition may be valid, states could enact
statutes limiting broadcasting hours or restricting the number of Pay TV stations which can broadcast in any one area.
Absolute prohibition does not benefit the public. On the contrary, it limits
the public's free choice. If the Act had been held valid, the people of California
would have been forced to accept, commercial television programs interrupted
by commercials. Thus, rather than creating any Pay TV monopoly, the Act
would have had the effect of perpetuating a monopoly of commercial television.
As the Weaver court aptly points out, should experience show that pay television
has become a'menace and danger to the public welfare, then appropriate legislation, within constitutionally permissible limits, could be enacted to correct that
61 52 Cal. 2d 360, 341 P.2d 310 (1959).
62 411 P.2d 289, 301, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 549 (1966)
63 See text accompanying note 60 supra.

(dissent).
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danger." However, it is submitted that the Act was premature in proscribing
a danger which might never materialize.
Pay television's effect on commercial television was a key issue in Weaver.
However, there were no pay television systems successfully in operation at the
time Weaver was decided.
Consequently, although the Free Television Act declared that pay, television would adversely affect commercial television and
the public welfare by tending to create a monopoly, these conclusions
were factually unsupported. 6 Moreover, there is little imminent danger that these contentions will be realized in the near future. It is
very unlikely that subscription television will deal a deathblow to commercial
television. Both types of television are profit oriented. The former charges the
viewer directly through subscription fees; the latter reaches the viewer's pocketbook indirectly when sponsors include advertising expenses in the market price
of their products. Commercial television thrives on audience size. Hence, it will
continue to seek programs which are viewed by the largest number of persons.
The types of programs pay television seeks to produce do not have popular
audience appeal. STV planned to limit its broadcasting time to only a fraction
of the time commercial television broadcasts. Thus, by having different types
of audiences and programs, the two systems of television could readily exist side
by side. The FCC, pending the outcome of an experimental trial period, has
rejected the argument that subscription television would necessarily destroy commercial television. 7
The decision of the California Supreme Court in Weaver opens the road for
Pay TV not only in that state, but in other states as well. However, while pay
television cannot be completely proscribed, it should not go wholly unregulated.
If subscription television has the potential to meet the imaginative and optimistic
expectations of its promoters, it should be controlled for the public's benefit.
It must not be allowed to get itself tangled in a maze of competing channels,
confusing both itself and its viewers. It is submitted that the FCC should assume
jurisdiction over the pay television area, even when programs are transmitted by
closed-circuit systems. Since it is unlikely that more than a few systems will be
able to operate in any one area, the FCC, by licensing them, could prevent needless confusion and insure quality programs and service. Furthermore, it would be
inequitable to regulate commercially sponsored television while allowing com64 Weaver v. Jordan, 411 P. 2d 289, 296, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 544 (1966).
65 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
66 For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of pay television and its effect on
present commercial television, see Hearings on Subscription Television Before the House Committee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). Report of the Assembly Interim Committee on Public Utilities and Corporations of the California Legislature
Relative to Pay Television, Vol. 17, No. 7 (1959-1961) stated:
There are no pay television concerns presently operating in the State of California.
This committee believes that until experience is gained from actual operations it is
impossible to determine the extent of and requirement for legislation. Any attempt to
draft legislation at this time is, in the opinion of this committee, premature. Accordingly, it is the recommendation of this committee to take no action until such time as
experience is forthcoming from actual operations. Cited in Brief for Respondent,
p. 14. (Emphasis added.)
67 Connecticut Comm. Against Pay TV v. FCC, 301 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 816 (1962). See also Federal Communications Commission's testimony in Hearings
on Subscription Television Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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plete freedom to pay television. It has been suggested that if pay television is not
subject to the same obligations of equal time and fairness as commercial television
it will acquire a competitive advantage. 5 Since the FCC has the power to regulate by licensing, it could assume jurisdiction in this area without running into
the free speech implications of the Free Television Act.
It is submitted that the California Supreme Court in Weaver v. Jordan
correctly decided that California's Free Television Act violated state and federal
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech. The public can only benefit by
having a choice between pay television and commercial television. Competition
usually sharpens quality. As Mr. Justice Burke stated in Weaver: "Monopoly
in the field of communication can best be avoided by permitting the growth
of that field of endeavor in directions and through media which will provide
the widest possible range and choice of ideas and of expression.""
Charles Weiss
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LISION. - On January 25, 1964, Roy Evans was driving his wife's 1961
Chevrolet station wagon in southern Indiana. This automobile had been designed, equipped, and sold by defendant General Motors Corporation with an
"X" type body frame. Such a frame does not incorporate lateral side support
rails. While driving through an intersection, Evans' automobile was struck in
the center left side by another vehicle. Evans sustained fatal injuries when the
side of his vehicle collapsed in upon him. Evans' wife initiated a wrongful death
action in three counts, alleging that defendant General Motors was negligent
in designing and failing to test the automobile frame design; had breached
implied warranties that the automobile was of merchantable quality and reasonably fit for its intended use; and had placed the automobile on the market in
a dangerous and defective condition since an "X" frame lacks the protection
a frame with side rails would afford. The District Court for the Southern District of Indiana dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint on the ground that
each count failed to state a cause of action.' The United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, in affirming, held: an automobile manufacturer has a
duty to design an automobile which is reasonably safe for its intended purpose;
however, although an automobile's participation in collisions may be foreseeable,
the manufacturer has no duty to design a frame which will protect the vehicle's
occupants in case of a collision. Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822
(7th Cir. 1966). Judge Kiley, dissenting, was of the opinion that automobile
manufacturers do have a duty to assume a greater responsibility in "designing,
testing and manufacturing products, with a purpose of giving reasonable pro-

68 Note, Aspects of Pay Television: Regulation, Constitutional Law, Antitrust, 53 CALIF.
L. REv. 1378, 1391 (1965).
69 Weaver v. Jordan 411 P.2d 289, 299, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 547 (1966).
1

Evans v. General Motors Corp., Ev. 64-C-85, S.D. Ind., June 11, 1965.
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tection against
harm to purchasers in the- use of the products for their intended
2
purposes.

Beginning with Justice Cardozo's monumental decision in MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.,3 American courts:have slowly begun to recognize a duty on
the part of manufacturers to design products which are reasonably safe for their
intended uses. In recent years, many of the defenses which were previously
available to •manufacturers have been eliminated." With the Citadel of Privity
very nearly conquered, courts have launched attacks in other areas of products
liability law, where manufacturers have for too long been immune from having
to assume fully their social responsibilities. One such area is litigation dealing
with the defective design of automobiles. Despite advances in other areas of
products liability law, many courts, in modem automobile products liability
litigation, continue to apply judicial precedents which have long outlived their
intended purpose:'.
Part of a manufacturer's duty to the consuming public is to use reasonable
care in designing or planning his product.6 This duty is differentiated from the
2 359 F.2d 822, 826 (7th Cir. 1966) (dissent). Judge Kiley believes that collisions can
be one of the "intended purposes" of an automobile, from which arises a duty to use reasonable care in design and testing so as to protect automobile occupants.
3 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
4 For an excellent discussion of the historic development and current law in this area, see
Jaeger, Product Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 501 (1964).
In the landmark decision, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960) it was held that lack of privity of contract was not a bar to a manufacturer's liability
for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. The trend in modem products liability
litigation is toward a strict privity-free liability for manufacturers of goods sold in the marketplace. RESTATEMENT '(SECOND), TORTS § 402A (1965) states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property, is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
For an explanation of this section of the RESTATEMENT, see Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co.,
237 F. Supp. 427 '(N.D. Ind. 1965). See also, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59
Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
5 One commentator has stated:
In the development of our free enterprise economy, the policy of the law in protecting and nourishing the development of the automobile industry, as well as all
industry in general, was a necessity. Thus, manufacturers were protected from tort
liability for their defective products- by privity restrictions, notice requirements, the
defense of contributory negligence, jurisdictional limitations, and workmen's compensation election statutes, buttressed by the reluctance of many courts to submit design
negligence cases to juries. However, the days when industry required such protection
and the moral climate of the nation favored it have long since passed. A poignant
example of manufacturing's economic self-sufficiency today is clearly seen when the
fact that General Motor's current sales annually exceed the gross 'national product of
many major countries of the world is considered.
Philo, Automobile Products Liability Litigation, 4 DUQUESNE L. REV. 181, 182 (1965).
6 Clark v. Zuzich Truck Lines, 344 S.W.2d 304 (Kansas City Ct. App. 1961); Texas
Bitulithic Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 357 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (application
for writ of error refused-no reversible error), citing with approval RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),
TORTS § 398 (1965) which states:
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others whom he
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manufacturer's duty to use reasonable care in the actual manufactur6 or building
of a product.' Thirty years ago, a case dealing with a manufacturer's liability
for defective product, design would have had little chance, of success, since this
area of the law was just emerging.' Even today, although prodicts liability
law is expanding rapidly, defective design decisions are still "relatively infrequent."9 The great majority of automobile products liability litigation concerns
the manufacturer's lack of , due care in building an automobile, rather than in
planning or designing it. In the former class of cases, a driver will sue the
manufacturer contending that faulty steering" or brakes" caused him to lose
control of his vehicle. Breach of duty and causation are relatively easy to prove
in defective manufacture cases. Accordingly, liability is frequently found. However, where the plaintiff's only allegation of lack of due care lies in the vehicle's
defective design, breach of duty and causation are much more difficult to prove.
One commentator believes this difficulty stems from a reluctance on the part
of judges to allow juries composed of laymen to decide whether there has been
a breach of duty in the design of a product which was prepared by experts."
Also, there is tie fear that a judgment for a particular plaintiff may result in a
flood of similar claims by others. 3 Such reasons, however, stind upon weak
foundations and disregard the basic purpose of our legal system. Expert witnesses
have been called to supply necessary testimony in diverse areas of the law.
Products liability litigation should, be no exception. The Pandora's Box argument that frivolous claims would flood the courts is equally without merit. Any
person who is deprived of a legal right through the breach of a legal duty on
another's part is entitled to have his cause of action litigated. Today, the law
is well-settled that consumers have a right to expect that the products they purchase will not be defective in design.'
In a strict defective design case, there need Ibe no allegations of defective
manufacture. The defect would occur, if at all, on the drawing board, rather
than on the assembly line. 5 Of course, it is still essential that there be some
should expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable use for physical
harm caused by his failure.to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan
or. design.
7 Norton Co. v. Harrelson, 278 Ala. 85, 176 So. 2d 18 '(1965); Maynard v. Stinson Aircraft Corp., 1940 U.S. Av. 71 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1937).
8 Sans, Jr., Liability for Negligent Design, Manufacture and Assembly of Machinery, 1965

ABA

SECT. INS., NEG.

& C.L. 212, 216.

9 Note, Manufacturer's Liability for Negligent Design, 14 DRAKE L. REv. 117 (1964).
"Where the alleged defect was one of design rather than construction, however, the, courts have
long seemed reluctant to impose liability on the manufacturer." Katz, Liability of Automobile
Manufacturersfor Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 HAnv. L. RMv. 863 (1956). See also
Annot. 76 A.L.R.2d 91, 94 (1961).
10 Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 320 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1963); Picker X-Ray Corp. v.
General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 '(D.C; Munic. Ct. App. 1962); Harvey v. Buick Motor
Co., 177 S.W. 774 (Kansas City Ct. App. 1915); Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63
N.J. Super. 476, 164 A.2d 773 (1960).
"
11 Ford Motor Co. v. Fish, 232 Ark. 270, 335 S.W.2d 713 (1960); Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 R2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); Rotche v. Buick Motor
Co., 358 Ill. 507, 193 N.E. 529 (1934); Standard Motor Co. v. Blood, 380 S.W.2d 651 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1964).
12 Noel, Manufacturer'sNegligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE
L.J. 816 (1962).
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 In Wagner v. Larson, 136 N.W.2d 312 '(Iowa 1965) plaintiff was injured when he fell
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defect which proximately caused the injury. This is where plaintiff experienced
difficulty in Evans. The first hurdle to plaintiff's recovery was the necessity of
showing some breach of duty on the part of General Motors. This initial step
is crucial, since there can be no actionable negligence without the prior existence
of a duty and its subsequent breach. Therefore, unless plaintiff could show a
duty on the part of General Motors to design an automobile frame which would
protect occupants in case of a collision, the frame could not be legally defective
if it failed to do so. Thus, it was incumbent upon plaintiff to prove that the "X"
frame was designed without due care for an intended purpose.
In Evans, the Seventh Circuit, affirmed the district court's dismissal of
plaintiff's amended complaint, and ruled as a matter of law that the intended
use of an automobile frame does not include protection of automobile occupants
in case of a collision. Clearly, manufacturers have no duty to design a product
which is accident-proof and incapable of producing injury." The imposition
of such a duty would be patently inequitable.
Virtually no article is altogether incapable of doing harm. A rollerskate or even a book may become an instrument of serious injury if placed
strategically at the top of a flight of stairs in the dark. Obviously the
maker of goods is bound to foresee and guard against only unreasonable
risks which result from some use of his product which a reasonable 17manufacturer would anticipate as likely enough to be taken into account.
Thus, where courts find that the use being made of a product at the time an
injury occurs is clearly beyond what a.reasonably prudent manufacturer ought
foresee, there will be no liability. 8 However, it is submitted that the Seventh
Circuit in Evans, erred in not remanding the case for jury trial. Granted a court
must determine, as a matter of law, the existence of a duty prior to submitting
the case for jury determination as to whether the duty had been breached."
In determining the existence and extent of any duty, a court will refer to "statutes,
rules, principles and precedents which make up the law... ."20 A court cannot
apply these tenets blindly, however, without a sense of social consciousness.
Otherwise, the common law could never endure the necessary changes caused
by technological and sociological progress. As has been noted, defective design
cases which go to judgment are very infrequent. Thus, in the short span of
into the moving cutting knives of a silo-unloading machine. Plaintiff did not allege negligence
or breach of warranty in the manufacture of the machine, but only in its design. The court
held that a duty existed on the part of the manufacturer to design the machine with reasonable
care for the safety of its intended users, and remanded the case for jury trial to determine
whether this duty had been breached.
16 Mulligan v. Otis Elevator Co., 322 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1963); Varas v. Barco Mfg. Co.,
205 Cal. App. 2d 246, 22 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1962); Harrist v. Spencer-Harris Tool Co., 244 Miss.
84, 140 So. 2d 558 (1962); Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
17 2 HAPER & JAMES, TORTS § 28.6, at 1546 (1956). See generally 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LTABILITY § 15.01 (1964).
18 In Favo v. Remington Arms Co., 67 App. Div. 414, 73 N.Y. Supp. 788 (1901), a verdict
was directed for a firearms manufacturer who had produced a weapon capable of being used
with black powder. When the gun injured a plaintiff who had used it with a more explosive
type propellant, recovery was denied. See generally HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 17, at
1546-47.
19 Morril v. Morril, 104 N.J.L. 557, 142 At. 337 (1928). See generally PROSSER, TORTS
§ 36 (3d ed. 1964).
20 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 19, at 207.

[Vol. 42: 111]

RECENT DECISIONS

thirty years during which courts have recognized a duty to manufacture a product
which is reasonably safe for its intended use, there has not been a great development of legal precedent in the automobile design area. 21 The basic reason
behind this may be
that trial attorneys have assumed far too long that the blanket responsibility for both accident and injury belongs to the driver. They have
neglected the role of the automobile not only as a culpable factor in the
accident (the "first collision"), but also as a direct contributor to the
injury (the "second collision"). While the automobile may not be a
primary factor in all first collisions-the impacting of the car-it is definitely
a primary factor in nearly all of the second22collisions-when occupants are
thrown against the interior of the vehicle.
A legal duty arises whenever the law sees fit to require an actor to take
precautions against those foreseeable risks which society believes are sufficiently
unreasonable to demand such precautions. 23 Foreseeability alone, however,
creates no duty. If such were the case, a manufacturer of hammers, foreseeing
injured fingers and thumbs, would be liable for every such injury.2 4 Thus, duty
a means to an end."5 The end
is established as a matter of social policy -as
in such a case as Evans would be to, prevent similar death and injury to automobile passengers. The means would be to impose upon automobile manufacturers a duty to design automobiles so as to protect occupants in the event of a
collision. "[T]here is still no greater incentive for improved design than the threat
of legal liability ....,,2'The idea that automobile manufacturers should legally
assume this duty of protection was not given widespread notoriety until 1956.7
.However, in the past ten years, much has been written to apprise automobile
manufacturers of their social and legal duty.28 Nonetheless, manufacturers have
been lax in upholding, and courts in enforcing, this necessary social responsibility.
In a recent independent cross-section survey, one hundred percent of the new
,vehicles tested were found to be defective.2" Another report suggests that modern
automobile design has actually increasedthe rate of fatalities in traffic accidents.2 0
"It is indeed striking to observe how ineffective the law has been to date in
doing anything about effectuating improvements in design to alleviate the daily
'blood bath of automobile inspired tragedy.' "31
There is no reason why cases involving the crashworthiness of automobiles
and the manufacturer's duty to protect occupants should not be won on the basis
21 Nader, Automobile Design: Evidence Catching Up With the Law, 42
32 (1965).
22 Id. at 32-33.
23 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 19, § 31, at 149.
24 Brief for Appellee, p. 39.
25 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 19, § 50, at 289.

DENVER L.C.J.

26 Katz, supra note 9, at 873.
27 Katz's article, supra note 9, was the first in-depth analysis of the law in this area.
28 E.g., Nader, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED "(1965). Pages 129-131 of this book deal specifically with automobile frames. See also Katz, Negligence in Design: A Current Look, 1965 INS.
L.J. 5; Time, Why CarsMust-And Can-Be Made Safer, April 1, 1966, pp. 26-27.
29 Consumer Reports, April, 1965, p. 175.
30 CORNELL UNIVERsrrY MEDICAL COLLEGE ANNUAL REPORT, Crash Injury Research
Project, i (1955).
31 Katz, supra note 9, at 873.
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of the manufacturer's duty to design safer vehicles. Additional safety devices are
presently feasible from an engineering standpoint. Nonetheless, manufacturers
have manifested little interest in incorporating these devices, into automotive
design. "General Motors Corporation, the world's largest automobile manufacturer, had, until recently, only one automotive safety engineer." 2 Safety
devices should be included as standard equipment on all new cars. Similarly,
failure to take safety features into account in designing modem automobiles
may well constitute a violation of the manufacturer's duty "to exercise reasonable
care in the adoption of a safe plan or design." 3
Not all courts have closed their doors to defective design suits. Language
in a few recent cases suggests that courts may be willing to impose upon manufacturers a duty to protect vehicle occupants in case of a collision 3 In Mickle
v. Blackmon,"5 plaintiff was seated in the front seat of an automobile involved
in a collision. The impact of the collision threw plaintiff against the auto's gear
shift lever, which penetrated her spinal cord and rendered her a paraplegic.
The York County, South Carolina, Circuit Court found that defendant Ford
Motor Company had breached its duty in not designing an automobile which
would be reasonably safe in an emergency situation and rendered a verdict for
the plaintiff.8 6 It is important to note the distinction in this case between the
cause of the accident and the cause of the injury." The defendant manufacturer
was responsible only for the latter. Obviously, the manufacturer did not intend
a collision to be a "use" of his product. Nevertheless, he incurred liability. Thus,
it can be seen that at least one court has recognized an automobile manufacturer's duty to design his product so that it is reasonably safe not only for its
8
intended use, but also for such "other uses which are foreseeably probable."
9
In Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, in speaking of reasonable care for unintended uses, said:
The defendants have contended throughout that they are liable only
for injuries caused in the course of the intended use of their product....
We agree with the general principle but the application the defendants
would have us make of it here is much too narrow. "Intended use" is
but a convenient adaptation of the basic test of "reasonable foreseeability"
framed to more specifically fit the factual situations out of which arise
questions of a manufacturer's liability for negligence. "Intended use" is
not an inflexible formula to be apodictically applied to every case. Normally
a seller or manufacturer is entitled to anticipate that the product he deals
in will be used only for the purposes for which it is manufactured and
32 Philo, supra note 5, at 193.
33 Id. at 206. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
34 Accord, Brandon v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 220 F. Supp. 855, 859 (E.D. Pa. 1963),
aff'd, 342 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1965). Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F. Supp. 677, 679 (S.D. Tex.
1963) (by implication); Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 393, 329 P.2d 605, 607
'(1958) (by implication).
35 Circ. Ct., 6th Judicial Circ., York County, S.C. (March 1963), discussed in Nader, supra
note 21, at 38-39.
36 Accord, Davlin v. Henry Ford & Son, Inc., 20 F.2d 317, 319 (6th Cir. 1927). The court
said: "Its [manufacturer's] duty was to use reasonable care in employing designs . . . which
would fairly meet any emergency of use which could reasonably be anticipated."
37 See, Nader, supra note 21, at 39.
38 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 17 § 28.4, at 1541. See, FRuJMER & FRIEDMAN,
op. cit. supra note 17 § 15.01.
39 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
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sold.... However, he must also. be expected to anticipate the environment
which is normal for the use of his product and .., must anticipate the
reasonably foreseeable risks of the use of his product in such an environment.4 0 (Emphasis added.)
The environment where automobiles are used is the highway. The likelihood
that drivers will operate their vehicles on the nation's highways in a negligent
manner is extremely high: Statistics show that between one-fourth and twothirds of all vehicles, sometime during their use, will be involved in accidents
where lives are lost or injuries occur." In approximately thirty-four percent
of all urban, and fourteen percent of all rural accidents, the automobile is impacted from the side.' In such a situation, a .frame designed with lateral side
support rails might well. protectth'e automobile's occupants from serious injury
or even death. Exploring the area of reasonable care for unintended uses further,
we find the Illinois Court of Appeals in Hardman v. Helene Curtis Industries,
Inc.,4 citing with approval Professor Noel's observation, that:
While there is no obligation to anticipate abnormal uses of a product,
the abnormality of a particulax use may be a close question. . . . The
problem is to determine whether or not the use of the product involved was
in fact so unintended and unforeseeable that the case should be taken from
the jury."4 (Italicized in original.)

In Evans, General Motors, as the designer of the "X" frame, should have
been charged with possessing, expert knowledge of the "X" frame's lack of safety
features.45 The usual standard which courts require of an expert is that he
possess such knowledge as is commonly 'possessed by other members of his trade
or profession. In a well-known'case, however, "expert knowledge;" was interpreted to require a defendant to exercise an even' greater diligence than is commonly exercised by other members of his trade.4 6 Courts have also imposed
upon manufacturers a duty to warn consumers of'pos~ible dangers which might
arise in the use of their product, even though there is no contention of defective
design or manufacture.4 In: designing and marketing the "X" frame, it can
be argued that General Motors fell below the safety criteria imposed by common usage in the automobile industry.4" It is submitted that General Motors
40
41

Id. at 83.
Brief for Appellant, pp. 48-49.

42

Brief for Appellant, p. 49.

43 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681 '(1964). In this case a five-year-old girl, who liked
the perfume smell of defendant's low flammability- hair spray, used large quantities of it on her
dress as well as her hair. When she accidentally set herself on fire with a candle, the court
held that this abnormal use was not unforeseeable and remanded the case for a jury trial.
44 48 Ill. App. 2d at 63, 198 N.E.2d at 691. Contra, Murphy v. Cory Pump & Supply Co.,
47 Il. App. 2d 382, 197 N.E.2d 849 (1964). The court ruled that *themanufacturer of a power
mower had no duty to place a guard over the blade lower than 84" from the ground. In so
ruling, the court held that the manufacturer was under no duty to protect children playing near
the machine, who might be oblivious to the danger. Murphy is criticized in Wright v. MasseyHarris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966).
45 Accord, Guffie v. Erie Strayer' Co., 350 F.2d 378 (3d Cir. 1965); Ross v. Philip Morris
& Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964). See, Noel, supra note 12, at 847-55.
46 The T. J. Hlooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.).
47 Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Hungerholt, 319 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1963).
48 Brief for Appellant, pp. 4-24 lists, among others, the following industry criticism of the
"X' frame; use of frames with side members, by other automobile manufacturers who asserted
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should have been apprised of its duty to design an automobile frame which
would protect occupants in the event of a collision. In not imposing such a duty,
the Seventh Circuit failed to follow recent judicial demands to curtail the
needless slaughter on American highways.
Today, in this legal province of negligence, considerations of social
welfare, or "social value," do (and should) affect the decisions as to a
defendant's liability or the duty he owes to a plaintiff. Can anyone really
believe . . .that it will promote an important "social value" to protect,
from liability to purchasers, the makers and sellers of an article which ...
will create a hazard far greater than would otherwise exist . . . ?49
A second problem confronting the plaintiff in Evans was proving that the
"X" frame's failure to protect the decedent was a proximate cause of his death.
In the usual automobile products liability case, the product involved must be
shown unfit for its intended use. In such cases, the product functions defectively prior to the occurrence of a collision, and, in precisely this respect, is the
active cause of the collision and attending injuries.5" However, since an automobile frame has a static nature,5 1 the likelihood of the frame actively causing
an accident is very remote. If a vital function of an automobile frame is to
prevent injuries which might occur as a result of the "second collision," rather
than to prevent the "first collision" itself,52 the frame fails in this essential function only after the occurrence of a collision, never before. If the frame fails in
its protective function, even though it is in no way the cause of a collision, it is
nonetheless a proximate cause of the resulting injuries.
Similar factual situations have been found to constitute proximate cause in
the past. In Brandon v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.,5" plaintiff was injured when
struck by falling objects while operating a forklift truck which was not equipped
with a protective canopy. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held: "The absence of these safety appliances was the
proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff, since if they had been attached,
this injury would not have occurred."5 4 In Ellis v. H. S. Finke, Inc.,"5 plaintiff
that such frames offer greater protection to passengers in the event of side impacts; statements
by General Motors itself, published in a house organ, recognizing the weakness of the "X"
frame; questioning disapproval of the suitability of the "C" frame's design to give protection to
passengers in the case of lateral collisions by Horace B. Campbell, M.D., Chairman, Automotive
Safety Subcommittee, Colorado State Medical Society, Vice-Chairman, AMA Committee on
Medical Aspects of Automobile Injuries and Deaths; condemnation by Consumer's Bulletin
(a publication of Consumer's Research, which is a nonprofit organization operating as a
technical and educational service for consumers, without support from business or industry).
49 Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d 102, 112 '(2d Cir. 1954) (dissent), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 923 (1955).
50 E.g., Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
921 (1953) (defective tie rod); Rotche v. Buick Motor Co., 358 I1. 507, 193 N.E. 529 (1934)
(defective brakes); Harvey v. Buick Motor Co., 177 S.W. 774, (Kansas City Ct. App. 1915)
(defective steering); Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d 549 (1953) (defective wheel).
51 This nature must be differentiated from the dynamic nature of most automobile components involved in products liability litigation whose nondefective function is action, i.e.,
brakes, lights, wheels, transmission, etc.; whereas the nondefective function of a frame in protecting automobile occupants is nonaction.
52 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
53 220 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
54 Id. at 859.
55 278 F.2d 54 (6th Cir. 1960).
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was injured when an elevator, not equipped with safety devices, fell on him.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed with the trial
court that if it had been shown that a safety device would have prevented the
elevator's fall, the case could have gone to the jury, which could have found
for the plaintiff. This type of proximate cause analysis is relatively new. Nevertheless it is sound. It has developed concurrently with the recognition of a
duty on the part of manufacturers to design their product so as to give consumers reasonable protection. Once the initial duty of protection is imposed
and is shown to have been breached, proving proximate cause through negative
causation should suffice to support a finding of liability.
It is submitted that the Seventh Circuit, in Evans, should have found that
General Motors owed Roy Evans a duty to design the frame of the automobile
which he was driving so as to give him reasonable protection in case of a lateral
collision. Once such a duty was found, the case should have been remanded
for jury trial to determine if, on the basis of negligence, breach of warranty,
or strict tort liability, this duty had been breached.
The great need for social reform in the area of automobile design safety
is indicated by recent federal legislation. 6 However, though this be true, limited
legislative standards should not be determinative factors in judicial decisions
expanding the common law analysis of liability for defective automobile products.
Immediate social injustice should not be condoned because of a hope for mediate
reparation.
Robert 1. Wilczek

LABOR LAw -EMPLOYER

FORBIDDEN

To WrrIhDRAW

FROM

A MULTI-

NEw CONTRACT HAs BEGUN. Sheridan Creations, a distributor of ladies' sweaters and other products, joined
the Knitwear Employers Association, a multi-employer association, after the
Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union had organized its employees.
Sheridan adopted the existing agreement between the association and union
and was a party to later agreements in 1960 and 1961. The 1961 agreement
was scheduled to terminate on April 30, 1963. On February 23 of the same
year, the union notified Sheridan and the association of its desire to negotiate.
EMPLOYER UNIT AFTER BARGAINING ON A

56

Separate bills dealing with automotive safety were respectively passed by each house

of the 89th Congress, 2d Session. The Senate unanimously passed S. 3005 on June 24, 1966.
112 CONG. REac. 13611-16 (daily ed. June 24, 1966); 24 CoNG. Q. 1365-67 (1966). The
House of Representatives, on August 17, 1966, unanimously passed H.R. 13228. 112 CONG.
REc. 18813-18 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1966); 24 CoNG. Q. 1765-66, 1819 (1966). Both bills
require automobile manufacturers to comply with interim'safety requirements to be published by the Secretary of Commerce before January 31, 1967, and revised standards to be
published by January 31, 1968. Compliance will be required within sc months to one -year
after publication. In two respects the House measure was more strict than its Senate counterpart. The former covered buses and, trucks and required used cars to comply with the
government standards within two years after the bill becomes effective. After voice approval
by the Senate, the House of Representatives version of the bill was signed into law as Public
Law 89-563 by President Lyndon Johnson on September 9, 1966. New York Times, Sept. 10,
1966, p. 1, col. 4. The reasons prompting this legislation can be found in Hearings Before
the Senate Committee on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 89-49 (1966); Hearings on
the Federal Role in Traffic Safety Before the Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization of
the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4 (1966).
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Sheridan did not respond to the union's notice, although its representatives did
attend two meetings between the association and the union. On April 1,
Sheridan filed a petition to decertify the union, alleging it no longer represented
the will of a majority of Sheridan's employees. The company notified the'association that it no longer intended to be bound by the multi-employer association.
When Sheridan refused to accept and ratify the collective bargaining agreement
between the association and the union, the National Labor Relations Board
held that the company had violated §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Labor
Management Relations Acte and issued a cease and desist order.' On a petition
by the Board to enforce its order, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the Board's determination and held: withdrawal from
a multi-employer unit is untimely, absent union consen, once negotiations on
a new contract have begun. NLRB v. Sheridan Creations, Inc.;,357 F.2d 245
(2d Cir. 1966).
Universal Insulation Corp., like Sheridan, was a member of a multiemployer unit. Three months after an agreement between the- International
Association of Heat and Frost Insulating and Asbestos, Workers Union, Local
46, and the multi-employer association had expired and bargaining on a new
agreement had begun, Universal informed a union representative that. it coild
not grant a wage increase under either a multi-employer or individual contract.
When the association arrived at a new contract which included 'a wage increase,
Universal refused to sign. The trial examiner and the NLRB held that the
employer had violated §§ 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (5) of the NLRA and issued a
cease and desist order requiring Universal to sign and abide by the multi-employer
agreement.3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in
enforcing the Board's order, cited Sheridan to the effect that withdrawal from
a multi-employer unit is untimely, absent union consent, once negotiations on
a new contract have started. Universal Insulation Corp. v. NLRB, 361 F.2d
406 (6th Cir. 1966).
Although many factors were involved in each of these cases, one is of overriding importance - the rule adopted by the Second Circuit in Sheridan and
approved by the Sixth Circuit in Universal. This rule holds that, absent union
consent, it is per se an unfair labor practice for an employer to withdraw from
a multi-employer unit once negotiations on a new contract have begun. Thus,
the employer's withdrawal is ineffective regardless of a showing of his good
faith or that there has been an adverse effect upon the collective bargaining
process.
Multi-employer bargaining entails several employers bargaining together
1 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a) (1), 61 Stat. 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1964), provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a) (5), 61 Stat.
141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964), provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 9(a)." The duty to bargain is defined in § 8(d) Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 158(d)
(1964), as including "the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached
if requested by either party. ... $
2
Sheridan Creations, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1503 (1964).
3 Universal Insulation Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. 1397 (1964).
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with the union. This practice has longbeen approved by 'both the Board and
courts." The Supreme Cburt has made clear that Congress, by its silence, has
given tacit approval to the Board's practice of certifying multi-employer units.5
There are three balic types of multi-employer units: formal employer associati6ns with officers and bylaws, infor-mal groupls'wihich engage in joint bargaining with the union, and finally, groups bf employers Who adopt a uniform
contract. Employers become members of a multi-employer group by manifestifig
their unequivrocal intention to be b'ofind by the outc6rme of the negotiations.'
The National Lab'or Relations Board has held that employers may withdraw from such a unit by manifesting an unequivocal inient to 'do so,7 provided
such withdrawal takes place "at an appropriate time."8 The problem 'remains
as to what constitutes an appropriate time for withdrawal. The Board ;has held
that an employr may appropriately withdraw from the uniit before bargaining
for a new contract has begun.' Moreover, an employer may withdraw from a multi-employer unit at any time with the union's consentY° ,However, once the contract has been agreed upon, an employir may never withdraw from the unit.' The
ostensible purpose behind'restricting an employer's withdrawal rights to theperiod
prior to commencement of negotiations is to assure that withdrawal is not used as a
bargaining lever. Despite some language to the contrary,"2 the Board has -never
4 E.g., NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957). TheBoard has recognized
the importance of multi-employer 'units by requiring employers and uniris to abide by rules
designed to safeguard .the associations. The Evening News Association, 154 N.L.R.B. No. '121
(1965) 60 L.R.R.M. 1149; The Kroger Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 569, (1964); Walker Electric Co.,
142 N.L.R.B. 1214, (1963); Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388 '(1958).
5 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1957). The Court said,
The' debates over the proposals demonstrate that Congress refused to interfere
with such bargaining because there was cogent evidence that in many industries the
multi-employer bargaining basis was a 'vital -factor in the effectuation of the national
policy of promoting labor peace through strengthened collective bargaining. The inaction of Congress with respect to multi-employer bargaining cannot be said to indicate an intention to leave the resolution of this problem to future legislation.' Rather,
the, compelling conclusion is that Congress intended "that the Board should continue
its established administrative practice of certifying multi-employer units, and intended

to leave to the Board's specialized judgment the inevitable questions concerning multiemployer bargaining boun'd to arise in the future.""
6 "The settled criterion for the inclusion of an employer in a multiemployer bargaining
unit is whether the employer unequivocally intends to be bound in collective bargaining by
group, rather than individual, action." York Transfer & Storage Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 139, 142
(1953). See also United Productions of America, 111 N.L.R.B. 390 (1955); The Kroger Co.,
148 N.L.R.B. 569 (1964).
7 Abbott Labs., 131 N.L.R.B. 569 (1961) (Employer's conduct which unequivocally
evinced its intention to pursue an independent course in collective-bargaining relations was
considered sufficient notice of withdrawal from multi-employer bargaining); Goldeen's, Inc.,
134 N.L.R.B. 770 (1961) (Employers were allowed to completely disband multi-employer
group by giving the union proper notice).
8 Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 393 (1958). See also McAnary & Welter, Inc.,

1
115 N.L.R.B. 1029, 1031 (1956).
9 Seattle Automotive Wholesalers Ass'n, 140 N.L.R.B. 1393 (1963).
10
of an
11
12

C & M Constr. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 843 '(1964). The employer would have been guilty
unfair labor practice had the union not tacitly consented to his withdrawal.
Donaldson Sales, Inc., 141 N.L.R.B. 1303 (1963).
Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395 (1958):
We would accordingly refuse to permit the withdrawal of an employer or a union
from a duly established multiemployer bargaining uniti except upon adequate written
notice given prior to the date set by the contract for modificatioh, or to the agreedupon date to begin the multiemployer negotiations. Where actual bargaining negotiations based on the existing multiemployer unit have begun, we, would not permit,
except on mutual consent, an abandonment of the unit upon which side has committed itself to the other, absent unusual circumstances (dicta).
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applied a per se approach to an employer's withdrawal during negotiations.13
However, the majorities in Sheridan and Universal did choose to apply such a
per se rule. This rule prevents an employer from ever withdrawing from an
association once bargaining on a new contract has begun. The employer's
good faith in seeking to withdraw would not be a defense.14 In a sharp dissent
in Sheridan, Chief Judge Lumbard advocated that the Board's present practice
of determining each case on its facts be continued. Judge Lumbard said:
"Neither potential instability of the bargaining process nor administrative convenience requires substituting a flat rule prohibiting withdrawal after negotiations have begun in place of an inquiry as to bad faith and possible harmful
effects.""
Both the Second and Sixth Circuits purport to base their adoption of the
per se rule on prior Board holdings. However, a close examination of the Board
opinions cited by these courts does not support such a position. The NLRB
did not apply any per se rule in deciding either Sheridan or Universal. On the
contrary, the Board engaged in a lengthy examination of the individual facts
of each case before reaching a final decision. In Sheridan, the Board's holding
that the employer could not withdraw during continuance of negotiations was
a minor point compared to its analysis of the employer's claim that the union
had lost its majority status. In Universal, the Board never explicitly held that
the employer could not withdraw. In fact, it assumed arguendo that he could.'"
Furthermore, if the Board had adopted the per se rule in Sheridan, there would
have been no need for it to discuss a few months later the effectiveness of the
employer's withdrawal in Universal.
Clearly, past Board decisions cited by the Second Circuit in Sheridan fail
to support the existence of a per se rule. The first, The Kroger Co.,' involved
an employer's attempted withdrawal from a multi-employer group immediately
prior to the adoption of a contract. In that case, the Board engaged in a lengthy
discussion of the facts before holding that the company could not withdraw
from the multi-employer unit. In Walker Electric Co.,'" an employer who had
taken part in negotiations for some time was found to have committed an
8(a) (5) violation when it did not notify the union of its intention to withdraw
from the unit until after unresolved issues had been sent to an industry mediation group. The Board found no violation of the NLRA in C & M Constr. Co.'9
since the union, by asking the employer to sign a separate agreement, had impliedly consented to his withdrawal. Any language which might be found in
this case to support a per se rule is mere dicta. Finally, the Board's opinion in
13 Tulsa Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 1487, 1499 (1964). The trial examiner
stated:
A careful analysis of precedent reveals that variations in facts and circumstances
preclude a per se approach, and demonstrates that the ultimate determination with
respect to timely withdrawal must turn upon a discrimination evaluation of all attendant facts and circumstances.
The NLRB adopted the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the trial examiner.
14 NLRB v. Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1966).
15 Id. at 250 (dissent).
16 Universal Insulation Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. 1397, 1398 (1964).
17 148 N.L.R.B. 569 (1964).
18 142 N.L.R.B. 1214 '(1963).
19 147 N.L.R.B. 843 (1964).
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the Ice Cream Driver'?s case is inapplicable since this case involved a union's
refusal to be bound by a multi-employer contract which had settled a strike.
Thus, an analysis of the cases upon which the Second Circuit relies in Sheridan
shows that the Board itself has never adopted the per se approach.
The critical question is not whether the Board has ever adopted a per se
rule, nor whether courts should approve such a rule. What is truly important
is the wisdom of adopting any per se rule in this area. This question may be
resolved either analytically or with a view toward national labor policy. Chief
Judge Lumbard chose to use the analytical approach in his dissent in Sheridan.
Lumbard stressed the consensual nature of multi-employer units. Since such
units are by their nature voluntary and consensual, Lumbard would allow an
employer to withdraw from such a unit at a proper time and for any reason
provided he gives proper notice.2 1 Lumbard cited The Evening News Ass'n for
the proposition that "Important practical considerations demonstrate the wisdom of leaving intact the freedom of the parties to form and dissolve, to modify
and adapt, multiemployer units." 2 He concluded, "In my view, we should
adhere to the procedure originally established by the Board of inquiring whether
the withdrawal was in good faith, and not harmful to the other parties."2
Admittedly multi-employer units can be formed only through the consent
of the employers. 4 However, American labor law has rejected the position
that the nature of employment relationships can be fully governed by consent.2"
Once the relationship is formed, law, and not the parties' own wishes, will regulate many of its terms. Thus, the consensual nature of multi-employer bargaining
does not prevent judicial regulation of the time for withdrawal.
Since there is no legal objection to the adoption of a per se rule, the only
question that remains is the wisdom of adopting such a rule. It is submitted
that sound policy considerations militate against the adoption of any per se rule.
The purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to provide for industrial
peace 6 Its provisions for unfair labor practices are designed to remedy abuses
rather than to punish. For this reason, rulings should be sufficiently predictable
to guide parties in their conduct of labor relations. At the same time, the rules
should be flexible enough to avoid grave injustices. The NLRB has recognized
20 Ice Cream, Frozen Custard Employees, Local 717, 145 N.L.R.B. 865 (1964).
21 NLRB v. Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1966) (dissent).
22 Ibid.
23 Id. at 249.
24 NLRB v. Sklar, 316 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1963); The Evening News Association, 154
N.L.R.B. No. 121 (1965), 60 L.R.R.M. 1149.
25 E.g., Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 157 '(1964) sets out the rights of the employees which the employer cannot abridge,
even with the consent of the employees. The entire national labor policy is based on the regulation of a basically consensual relationship-that of employer-employee. Both wages and hours
are regulated by statute. Neither the employer nor employee may vary these regulations by
consent.
26 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 1, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 141 (1964) states:
It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full flow of
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their
relations affecting commerce, . . . to define and proscribe practices on the part of
labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general, welfare,
and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting
commerce.
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this need for flexibility by ruling only on concrete cases rather than adopting
abstract rules. The per se rule adopted by the Second and Sixth Circuits in
Sheridan and Universal does not meet the Board's own criteria. Although it
has the advantage of certainty, it lacks the desired flexibility.
Obvious situations exist where an employer. would be hesitant to join a
multi-employer unit if he were unable to withdraw from the unit after he learned
the union's demands and the association's response. It is submitted that courts,
rather than blindly applying any per se rule, should create a rebuttable presumption that an employer's withdrawal is untimely once negotiations, have begun.
The employer would be able to rebut such a presumption by showing that he
acted in good faith, that the union was not unduly prejudiced, and that he gave
unequivocal notice of his intention to withdraw from the multi-employer unit
as soon as he was informed of the union's demands and the other employers'
attitude towards these demands." Such a flexible standard, rather than a rigid
rule, would provide needed certainty withoit discouraging employers from multiemployer bargaining.
James T. Harrington

27 This rule would not change the present holdings. In Sheridan, the employer did not
withdraw as soon as he could have. In addition, he refused to bargain with the union at all,
either singly or through the association. Universal would also remain unchanged since the
Board found that the employer did not effectively withdraw. However, Universal involved a
situation where the presumption might have prevented trouble. The employer in this case believed in good faith that he could afford a wage increase. If he had been informed that he
could withdraw from the multi-employer group as soon as he knew the association was offering
a wage increase, but at no later date, he might have withdrawn at that time, or acquiesced in
the agreement once it had been reached.
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